The Politics of Place: Montesquieu, Particularism, and the Pursuit of Liberty by Joshua Bandoch

Author:Joshua Bandoch [Bandoch, Joshua]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Philosophy, History & Theory, Modern, Political Science, 18th Century, History, Political
ISBN: 9781580469029
Google: Ego7EAAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 35545769
Publisher: Boydell & Brewer
Published: 2017-01-15T12:36:55+00:00

Montesquieu prefers the Lycian scheme. One reason is his apparent approval of the council of the confederation appointing the magistrates of the towns. Another reason is their proportionate distribution of votes. He finds it problematic that Holland does not assign votes based on the power of each province, especially in the case of Amsterdam, which is more powerful and much wealthier.88 The Dutch political system is, in this sense, out of whack. Despite this, Montesquieu’s politics of place impels him to refrain both from condemning the Dutch system and from recommending significant changes. His reservations about Amsterdam being underrepresented notwithstanding, the Dutch system seems to function well enough at a basic level.

A federal republic must form a significant yet carefully calibrated union in order to be successful. It is a political order in which “many Body politics consent to become citizens of a larger state that they want to form. It is a society of societies, that makes a new one, which can grow by new associates that unite with it” (IX.1.369). “A republic,” Montesquieu explains, “that unifies itself through a political confederation has given itself over entirely, and has nothing more to give” (IX.3.372). In order to form this significant union, the federal republic needs a similar esprit and a strong political leader.

Member states need to share an esprit to confederate successfully. Montesquieu never states this explicitly. But his examples, and the nature of his discussion, confirm it. The Dutch shared mœurs, religion, a language, history, and commercial interests before formally forming a federal republic in the sixteenth century. Much the same is true for the Swiss, with the exception of language, and for the Germans, except that Germany did not exist formally until later. While Rome stayed inside Italy, member states also shared a similar religion, mœurs, history, and language, even before sharing political institutions. In Greece two alliances in the Peloponnesian War tended to divide (though not perfectly) between oligarchies with Sparta and democracies with Athens, so each alliance shared a political system. If the esprits of member states are too different—if their values, priorities, laws, institutions, and so on conflict—then the viability of the confederation comes into question and under threat. As I have argued elsewhere, this remains true today. We need only look at the problems facing the European Union to see that when states differ on these important issues, it is more challenging to form and maintain a cohesive and effective political union.89 While sharing elements of an esprit might almost be a necessary condition, it is not sufficient. It assists in the formation of a functioning political union, but it does not serve as a guarantee. Other factors also are key.

Federal republics need an effective executive, because arriving at decisions collectively can prove quite difficult. Member states sometimes have divergent interests. Policymaking can become a tempestuous affair. Moreover, some members are bigger and stronger than others, which presents the possibility that they will strong-arm weaker members. Some issues, such as making war and bringing in new members, should require unanimous consent.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.