The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics by Lazari-Radek Katarzyna de & Singer Peter

Author:Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna de & Singer, Peter [Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna de]
Language: eng
Format: azw3
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2014-05-07T16:00:00+00:00

8

Ultimate Good, Part I: Perfectionism and Desire-Based Theory

1. Sidgwick on Ultimate Good

We saw that the rules of common sense morality, even if at first apparently self-evident, could be made more precise only by referring to the principle of prudence or the principle of benevolence. Both of those principles require us to aim at something good—either the good on the whole of an individual or the universal good of everyone. But what is this good at which we have an obligation to aim? In the Methods, Sidgwick discusses this question in two widely separated chapters. In the ninth chapter of book I he tells us that he will examine ‘the import of the notion “Good” in the whole range of its application’. His concern here is with the conceptual question of what we mean by the term ‘good’, rather than with the substantive question of what is good. Then in book III, chapter 14—after setting out the axioms we have just considered—he develops and defends his own answer to the substantive question ‘What is the ultimate good?’

In discussing the meaning of ‘good’ Sidgwick first rejects the view that to say something is good is implicitly to say that it is a means to pleasure. He offers some examples of common usage to show that this cannot be what we mean by ‘good’—for example, to say that someone has ‘good taste’ in wines or art is not at all the same as saying that he derives the greatest enjoyment from them. Moreover, while we regard individuals as the final judge of what gives them the greatest pleasure, the idea of ‘good taste’ assumes a ‘universally valid standard’ to which the judgment of those who we say have good taste comes near (ME 108–9). The most important objection Sidgwick makes to any attempt to define ‘the good’ as equivalent to ‘pleasure’ or ‘happiness’, however, is one that anticipates G. E. Moore’s ‘naturalistic fallacy’ argument. Sidgwick points out that, when hedonists affirm that pleasure or happiness is their ultimate good, they imply that the meaning of ‘pleasure’ or ‘happiness’ differs from the meaning of ‘the good’. Otherwise, what they are saying would not be a significant proposition, but a tautology (ME 109).

After rejecting the view that we can simply define good in terms of pleasure or happiness, Sidgwick examines a definition that links a person’s good with what he or she desires. He traces this view to Hobbes, who wrote: ‘whatsoever is the object of any man’s Desire, that it is which he for his part calleth Good, and the object of his aversion, Evil’.1 Sidgwick begins his discussion of this view with the obvious point that ‘a man often desires what he knows is on the whole bad for him’. One example is a desire for revenge when you know that reconciliation would be much better for you. Moreover, what we desire may appear to be good, but turn out to be, as Sidgwick puts it, ‘a “Dead Sea apple”, mere dust and ashes in the eating’ (ME 110).

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