The Nature of Sympathy by Scheler Max; & Graham McAleer

Author:Scheler, Max; & Graham McAleer
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Routledge

Chapter VIII

The Phylogenetic Origin and Extension of Fellow-Feeling

IT has now been shown that fellow-feeling is an ultimate and original function of the spirit, whose empirical genesis is in no way due in the first place, to other processes, such as reproduction, imitation, illusion or hallucination, in the life of the individual. This does not merely mean that fellow-feeling is 'innate' (in every single human being), but that it is also part of the constitution of all emotional beings generally. Moreover, fellow-feeling certainly is innate, and in no sense first acquired in individual life; what is inborn, that is, is the more or less marked tendency to avail oneself of this function and to exercise it in practice. I say advisedly, the more or less marked tendency; for there can be no doubt that the considerable variations in the exercise of fellow-feeling, among different races, peoples and individuals, are not attributable to the variety of their experiences. The part which heredity plays in this has not yet been sufficiently investigated, but these tendencies differ basically from the outset, as any close observation of children will show. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Adam Smith long ago insisted on this point as an objection to all explanation of fellow-feeling in terms of utilitarianism and the associationist psychology.

It seems that fellow-feeling undergoes an extensive development in each individual; there is good reason to speak of a 'childish egoism', only later giving place, increasingly, to fellow-feeling. However, the essential part of this development is not due to fellow-feeling proper at all, but to growth in our understanding of the nature and differences of mental processes in other people.1 We should also bear these factors in mind, for example, when judging primitive peoples and their attitude and behaviour to strangers and to other tribes. And the same holds good in considering the historical development of modes of feeling. The progress of civilization has often been ascribed to an enlargement of fellow-feeling—for instance, in the abolition of torture, the mitigation of capital punishment and flogging, and the stamping-out of barbaric sports such as bull-fighting or the wild-beast combats of the Roman arena. But quite wrongly, in our opinion. The prime credit for such moral reforms is due, not to enlarged sympathies, but to the enhanced susceptibility to suffering which civilization brings in its train. Those who are more susceptible to suffering, who suffer more than others under the same pain, are also more sensitive to pain in others than those who are less susceptible. The degree of susceptibility is constant, however, in both the idiopathic and heteropathic attitudes. An increase in its amount has nothing to do with an enhancement of sympathy. Nor does a greater susceptibility have any positive value in itself. It is only where susceptibilities are equal that a greater capacity for pity implies moral superiority. Besides, there are other motives for the above-mentioned reforms, some of which are also of moral value, though they are not relevant here.

Now while admitting that fellow-feeling is inborn in

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