The First Afghan War 1839-42: Invasion, Catastrophe and Retreat by Richard Macrory

Author:Richard Macrory [Macrory, Richard]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: 19th Century, Asia, Colonialism & Post-Colonialism, Europe, Great Britain, History, Political Science, Technology & Engineering, War & Military
ISBN: 9781472813992
Google: wACGDAAAQBAJ
Amazon: B01HI8M6BM
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
Published: 2016-08-24T23:00:00+00:00

ATTACK ON GHAZNI, 23 JULY 1839

Ghazni was a fortress town situated on the route between Kandahar and Kabul. With walls over 60ft high (1), surrounded by ditches, and containing an imposing citadel (2), it was considered impregnable. Shah Soojah urged Sir John Keane, commander of the Army of the Indus, to bypass the fort and continue towards Kabul, but this would have been far too risky a strategy. Siege guns had been left behind in Kandahar, and the chief engineer, Thomson, advised that the city’s defences made conventional techniques of mining and escalading impossible. The gates to the city had been blocked with stones and rubble, but intelligence was received that one gate, the Kabul Gateway (3), had been left untouched to allow communication with Kabul. Thomson recommended a coup de main – since the bridge over the ditch was unbroken (4) and the road up to the gate clear, it could be possible to blow the gate with gunpowder under cover, and storm the fortress by surprise. In the early morning of the 23rd a small group of engineers – three officers, three sergeants, and 18 sappers – approached the gate and laid some 300 pounds of gunpowder in 12 sandbags. The operation was designed to be conducted in silence and in secret, but they were challenged, and the Afghans began firing from the walls (5). Contemporary accounts refer to blue lights (6), some form of illumination flare, glaring from the top of the battlements. Lieutenant Durand, one of the officers, recounted afterwards: ‘The sappers, having deposited the last of the powder and retired. Durand, aided by Sergeant Robertson, uncoiled the hose, laying it close to the foot of the scarp, whilst the defenders, impatient at the restraint of their loopholes, jumped up at the top of their parapets, and poured their fire at the foot of the wall, hurling down also lumps of earth, stones, and bricks, but omitting fortunately the blue lights.’ The 70-foot linen hose was laid out, fortuitously reaching a previously unknown sallyport which provided some shelter for the engineers. For a time, it proved impossible to light using a slow match but eventually it caught, and the engineers retired (7) to avoid the explosion. There remained some confusion as to whether the gate had been fully destroyed but eventually a bugler sounded the attack. The advance party (8) of four companies (HM 2nd and 17th regiments, 1st Bengal Infantry, and a flank company of HM 13th Light Infantry) under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie (9) that had been waiting at the bridge, now moved to enter the gateway, closely supported by a larger storming party commanded by Brigadier Sale. After three hours of fierce street fighting, the city was taken by the British with just 17 killed on their side, and the Afghans sustaining losses of over a thousand. The fall of Ghazni utterly demoralized Dost Mohammad who abandoned Kabul allowing the British to enter the city without resistance.

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