The Dictator's Shadow by Munoz Heraldo;

Author:Munoz, Heraldo;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Basic Books

AT THE TIME of the 1986 ambush in Cajón del Maipo, Pinochet was already setting his sights on holding the planned 1988 plebiscite. In a speech in the southern town of Santa Juana, Pinochet had hinted that he would be the candidate, although the junta had to vote on it. “We will not hand over the power for the fun of it,” Pinochet had declared. The junta favored the “projection of the regime” into the future, but not necessarily with General Pinochet at its helm. Admiral Merino and Air Force Commander Matthei backed the idea of holding a competitive election. Later, General Matthei went even further: the “ideal” candidate, he said, in either a plebiscite or a competitive election, should be a civilian.

At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Socialist Party in late September 1986, one of its members, José Joaquin Brunner, presented a document, “Notes for Discussion,” in which he offered a thumbnail analysis of the present political moment and the coming challenges.

The strategy of social mobilization through protests and strikes was becoming increasingly weak, fragmented, and improvised, he wrote. Moreover, Pinochet’s effort to portray the opposition as an armed minority, rather than the overwhelming majority of the country, was succeeding, especially in the wake of the failed ambush. Pinochet had “redefined the national situation, once again, in terms of a scenario of war,” while simultaneously accentuating the “personalist” trait of the regime as opposed to the “institutional” ideal favored by the junta commanders. Brunner ended on a pragmatic note, concluding that if we were to find a workable way out of Pinochet’s tyranny, we would have to work within the confines of the 1980 constitution, using it to demand the expression of popular sovereignty in whatever form was available, whether via elections or a plebiscite. Our priority should be to press for the dictation of the transition laws; to register to vote whenever voter rolls would be opened; and to be ready to negotiate with the armed forces while also pressuring the Communist Party into abandoning its armed operations.

Brunner’s remarks sparked an intense discussion. I still have the notes I scribbled while it was going on. I took the floor to agree that our protests had been losing their resolve; even so, demobilization would be far more demoralizing. As the ambush on Pinochet receded into the past, the contradictions within the regime would sharpen once again, I added. I agreed, though, that we needed a new message—we should mobilize to demand free elections instead of a plebiscite in ’88. Nobody said it clearly and openly, but we were all thinking the same thing: to succeed, we were going to have to play Pinochet’s game. The biggest question was whether Pinochet would allow us to compete on anything remotely resembling “a level playing field.” The day the voter rolls were finally opened, almost fifteen years after they were destroyed (the 1978 Consulta motivated by the UN human rights condemnation of the Pinochet regime and the 1980 constitutional

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