The Crisis in Continental Philosophy by Piercey Robert;

Author:Piercey, Robert;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Published: 2019-11-22T16:00:00+00:00

Distinguishing form and content:

Kant’s revenge, part two

That said, it would be a mistake to see Heidegger’s approach to the historical thesis as a clean break with Hegel’s. Despite its promise, Heidegger’s form-based approach does not simply leave Hegel’s approach behind. Heidegger does not manage to avoid all the problems that a content-based approach raises, because he never adequately distinguishes philosophy’s content from its form. As a result, he never shows that his position is a genuine alternative to Hegel’s, and he never rules out the possibility that a problematic conception of philosophy’s subject matter may sneak back into his account. In this respect, Heidegger’s work on the history of philosophy may leave us no better off than Hegel’s. In fact, in one way, it leaves us worse off. Hegel’s approach to the historical thesis is plagued by incoherence, but this incoherence is not disguised. Heidegger’s approach flirts with the same incoherence, but looks like an alternative to Hegel’s. Heidegger’s approach to the history of philosophy is not just incoherent; it is an approach whose incoherence is covered up. But why is this the case?

If we want to advance a form-based argument for the historical thesis, we must be able to distinguish philosophy’s form from its content. And if we want to use Heidegger as the basis for an argument of this sort, we must be able to draw such a distinction in the context of his work. Otherwise, the very idea of advancing a form-based argument makes no sense. So if we want to use Heidegger’s thought as the basis for a form-based argument, it must be possible for Heidegger to distinguish philosophy’s form from its content—its ‘how’ from its ‘what.’ Heidegger need not do so himself. But it must be possible to do so in the context of his work. Among other things, this means that Heidegger’s thought must allow us to define philosophy’s form and its content independently of one another. Form and content cannot simply be the same thing. Heidegger clearly wants to draw such a distinction. It is implied by his claim that philosophy’s method—phenomenology—is purely formal, and can be defined without reference to the contents to which it is applied. If Heidegger’s form-based approach is to work, then he must be able to make good on this claim. He must have the resources to distinguish the object of phenomenological interpretation from the way in which that object is grasped. If he does not, then his approach to the history of philosophy will not be the alternative to Hegel’s that it appears to be.

But it is not clear that Heidegger can distinguish phenomenological interpretation and its object in this way. There is an important asymmetry between Heidegger’s discussion of interpretation in Being and Time and the uses to which he puts this concept in fundamental ontology. The discussion of Auslegung in Being and Time focuses entirely on the interpretation of entities that are ready-to-hand. It describes what is involved in seeing an entity as something. This

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