The Central Philosophy of Buddhism by Murti T R V

Author:Murti, T R V [T. R. V. Murti]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780203706703
Publisher: Taylor and Francis

The Dhātus or Bases, according to the Canons, are six. These are —earth, water, fire, air, aāaāś (ether) and consciousness..1The later and more well-known ddhātuclassification is the one into eighteen elements. This is a modification of the aāyatanaclassification (six sense-organs and sense-data) with the respective consciousness (visual consciousness etc.) added; it does not imply any new principle of division.2 The six-dhaāu classification is an attempt exhaustively to enumerate and define the ultimate components of existence. In the well-known text of the Pitaāutra Samaāama Suūra,s3it is stated that the human being (purusṣ pudgalahḥ is composed of six basic components (sṣdḍdhaāuhḥ, implying that man (his physical and conscious part) is analysable without residue into these six elements. The differentia of each element (asaāhaāanṇ dharma-dhaāanṇā dhaāuhḥ is also given. This line of thought is interesting, as it throws light on the nature of the relation between a thing (laksṣa) and its specific property (laksṣnṇ). NNāgārjuna indeed makes it a theme for his critique of the doctrine of definition or substance-attribute relation.

Dhātus are Radical elements or Surds; they are the irreducible stuff of which phenomenal (saṁskṛta) things are composed. Two notions are involved in this conception: the fixing up of the number and nature of the components, and second the way in which these components are compounded to form things of the phenomenal sphere (samskṛta). The first is examined here and the second in the subsequent section.

A basic element, to be distinguished from another, must possess a specific character—the differentia or definition which separates it from others. The Buddhists do give us the differentia of these elements, e.g., non-obstruction of ākāśa (Space), hardness of earth, cohesion (sneha) of water etc. Is there any distinction between the definitum (ākāśa, pṛthvī, etc.) and its differentia1 (anāvṛtiḥ, kāṭhinyam etc.)? If there is not, we cannot define the dhātus, nor distinguish one from the other. Once a distinction is accepted, we may further ask whether the definitum (lakṣya) is prior to the defining characteristic or not. If the lakṣya, (e.g. ākāsa) could exist without its specific property, then it would be non-descript in itself; and a non-descript entity is a non-entity; such a thing is not an object of experience.2 If there is no characteristic entity, to what will an attribute or definition apply?3

Moreover, the differentia (lakṣaṇa) cannot be predicated of a determinate (salakṣaṇa) or non-determinate entity (alakṣaṇa). The latter is a contradiction: how can the non-determinate be ascribed a determination? If the first, as the subject is already determinate, what further function would be served by ascribing to it this determination? Even after this determination is predicated, a second or a third may have to be applied; and this would lead to a regress ad infinitum; there is no third alternative of an entity which is both determinate and indeterminate or neither of them.4

Differentia being thus not predicable, the subject-term too is unavailable. And without the subject of predication, there can be no differentia as such. There is no positive entity which is without the subject-predicate relation.5

It might be urged that these objections militate against the existence of a positive entity (bhāva).

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