The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza by Don Garrett

Author:Don Garrett [Don Garrett]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
ISBN: 9780521392358
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Altruism and the primacy of the self

As was the case with the apparent instances of prudential desire, apparent instances of altruistic desire pose a prima facie threat to Spinoza’s naturalism. In this subsection, I want to show why this is so and also how Spinoza’s way of dealing with apparent altruism mirrors his way of handling apparent prudence.

A case of altruistic desire would be one in which I desire to do F (e.g., assist a stranger in need), not because doing so will give me pleasure or avert some pain that I would have had, but simply because doing so will benefit some other individual. A desire to do F can be altruistic even if doing F is beneficial to me. Altruism simply requires that I do not desire to do F because of the benefit to me of such an action.

The possibility of such a desire would threaten Spinoza’s naturalism. To see why this is so, consider the general metaphysical analogue of the claim that altruistic desires are possible. Here I use the metaphysical notions that correspond, in Spinoza’s system, to desire, joy, and sadness in order to generate a description of what might be called other-directed striving:

(ODS) It is possible for an object x to strive to do F, not because such an action would increase x’s power of acting or offset a decrease in x’s power of acting, but because such an action would increase another individual’s (y’s) power of acting or offset a decrease in y’s power of acting.

Altruistic desires would be a species of other-directed striving.

The threat to naturalism emerges from the fact that while human beings (and perhaps certain other creatures) seem to be capable of other-directed striving, objects in general seem not to be. Return for a moment to the example of the stone whose motion is restrained by a sling. Let us embellish the example by saying that the motion of the sling itself is restrained by a person holding it. Now, as we have seen, the stone strives to continue moving and perhaps strives to be free of the sling. Such strivings are directed at states that will maintain or enhance the stone’s power of acting. However, there seems to be no plausible way to attribute to the stone a striving for the sling’s well-being. For example, the stone does not strive that the sling be free of the person holding it (or if the stone can be said to strive in this way, that is only because such freedom for the sling would generate freedom for the stone). Nor can the stone plausibly be said to strive for the preservation or increase in power of acting of any other object apart from the sling. In general, stones and most other objects do not seem capable of other-directed striving.

If human beings were capable of such striving, while most other objects were not, we would be faced with a potential violation of naturalism. In their capacity for other-directed striving, human beings would seem to depart from the rest of nature.

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