The Cambridge Companion to Kant by Paul Guyer

Author:Paul Guyer
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

III

So far, I have only looked at Kant’s discussion of the principle of genera. In so doing, I have gone beyond a mere characterization of this principle in an attempt to show that Kant holds that it has a transcendental as well as logical use. But in order to fill out Kant’s view of the methodology of natural science, it is important to understand how he conceives of the function of the two other principles of reason that make up the idea of a completely adequate system of scientific knowledge.

The second principle of reason in its regulative use is that of specification. This principle states that it is always possible to differentiate a generic concept into two or more specific ones. As in the case of the principle of genera, Kant introduces this second principle by distinguishing a logical use of that principle from a transcendental one. Discussing the different temperaments that scientists actually have, some searching for unity and others for differences, Kant proceeds to discuss the logical principle of specification:

This latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical principle that aims at the systematic completeness of all knowledge – prescribing that, in beginning with the genus, I descend to the manifold that may be contained thereunder, in such fashion as to secure extension for the system…. This law of specification can be expressed: entium varietates non temere esse minuendas [the variety of entities is not to be thoughtlessly reduced].

(A 655–56 / B 683–4)

Kant points out that scientists often proceed by attempting to show that an empirical genus really conceals two or more different species under its scope. A modern example of such a scientific advance would be the discovery that a given empirical substance such as uranium actually has two or more different isotopes. In fact, Kant gives an example, once again drawn from the chemistry of his day, that is very similar to this one.

That absorbent earths are of different kinds (chalk and muriatic earths) required for its discovery an antecedent rule of reason that made it into an assignment for the understanding to seek for the difference that it assumes to be so richly present in nature.

(A 657 / B 686)

In giving this example, however, Kant goes beyond the attempt to legitimate the logical principle of specification. In fact, he states that this scientific discovery requires more than the logical principle of specification, for that principle does not entail that nature itself would satisfy the understanding’s attempt to further differentiate its empirical concepts.

That Kant does think that the logical principle of specification requires a transcendental principle for its grounding can be seen in the following quotation:

One can easily see, however, that also this logical law would be without meaning and application if a transcendental law of specification did not undergird it, a law that to be sure does not demand of the things that can be objects for us an actual infinity in relation to their difference.

(A 656 / B 684)

Kant’s discussion of the transcendental principle of specification raises an important issue.

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