The Cambridge Companion to Descartes by John Cottingham

Author:John Cottingham [John Cottingham]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
ISBN: 9780521366236
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

The demonstration of the truth rule begs the question against the skeptical supposition. That it does beg the question will be apparent, even to persons who have demonstrated the truth rule and recollect having done so, if they review their prior argumentative procedure. Such a person would also know that a current clear and distinct perception of the truth rule has the result that one irresistibly believes the truth rule, even though it is the conclusion of a question-begging argument. To proceed, under these conditions, to reproduce the demonstration of the truth rule seems akin to knowingly taking a pill, or knowingly submitting to a hypnotic spell, that induces an irresistible belief for which one lacks good evidence.48 This is knowingly to enter an epistemological illusion.

The present version of the psychological interpretation does not succumb to this objection. Descartes is trying to show how scientific knowledge can be achieved. Although one cannot avoid believing the truth rule when one does reproduce its demonstration, one can avoid reproducing its demonstration. Someone who has the continuing ability to reproduce the demonstration of the truth rule can decline to exercise that ability. Such a person has nevertheless achieved continuing unshakability in the weak sense, and hence scientific knowledge, any scruples about the illusion notwithstanding. The objection can be put in a slightly different form. Would not someone who, under the conditions outlined, proceeded to reproduce the demonstration of the truth rule in order to restore a dislodged belief, or to preempt impermanence, be a party to the illusion? Or consider someone who supposes that the skeptical hypothesis is true. It comes to his attention that there is an argument, such that if he attends to the argument, he will irresistibly believe that the skeptical hypothesis is false. He wonders whether it is not in the nature of the case that the argument, whatever its details, will beg the question against the skeptical supposition. He satisfies himself that, inevitably, it will beg the question. This person’s beliefs are not yet unshakable. Would he not be a party to the illuson if he proceeded to attend to the argument for the truth rule for the first time?

I speculate that Descartes would respond with reference to the costs of not entering the illusion. The illusion consists in the irresistible belief in the truth of a proposition for which one lacks good evidence. Any clear and distinct perception is implicated in the illusion. There is no clear and distinct perception for which one has good evidence, if good evidence requires a non-question-begging argument against the skeptical supposition. Avoiding the illusion requires that one decline to exercise one’s faculty of clear and distinct perception altogether. Descartes holds that whereas clear and distinct perception is internally coherent, sense perception is internally incoherent – sense perception on its own generates conflicting beliefs. Clear and distinct perception resolves these conflicts by sustaining one of the conflicting beliefs, and correcting the other. The resolution is effected in

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