The Art of War in the Network Age by Henrotin Joseph;

The Art of War in the Network Age by Henrotin Joseph;

Author:Henrotin, Joseph;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated
Published: 2016-10-10T00:00:00+00:00


The first and second of Dickson’s “revolutions” would occupy a central place in the second Offset strategy. Formally launched in 1977 by Harold Brown (then the Secretary of Defense) and William Perry (a future Secretary of Defense), the initiative led to the design of systems that would be considered central in the future RMA/Transformation and which also reified the tactic-centric logic of “detection-processing”. The quantitative superiority of the Warsaw Pact on NATO and American forces had to be defeated by a qualitative superiority. One of the flagship programs of this effort was the Assault Breaker [HEW 82]. Launched by the US Army and the US Air Force in 1978, it combined airborne detection with Soviet shielding provisions and processing at a safe distance. The Pave Mover radar system could detect movements of vehicles on the ground as well as determine and categorize lines of penetration. The radar could also survey large zones and detect movements as well as zoom in on a more restricted area, producing a high-resolution synthetic image to identify stationary targets. Initially, it was a question of equipping F-111 twin-jets. These could transmit the data to a ground station because the radar also served as a communication link. Another plane, whose existence was not revealed until the middle of the 1990s, was also designed.

The F-111 operated on the front line and had a radar range limited to a 100 km, so the issue of detecting at great depths into the enemy position was raised. The Tacit Blue, a very stealthy single-jet aircraft constructed specifically around the Pave Mover radar system, was also engaged over the Warsaw Pact countries, using its radar to transmit data in real time to the analysis stations on the ground. The US Army’s small twin-engined OV-1 Mohawk reconnaissance planes were also equipped with a less complex version of Pave Mover, completing the network of sensors. The analysts posted in the ground station had to identify the lines of enemy penetration and activate the launch of strikes against tanks. If the “system of systems” effectors were diversified, two single programs were indicative of the overall effort. The T-16 and T-22 missiles should have the capability to be fired from zones far away from the front line of the battle zone (Forward Edge of the Battle Area [FEBA]) in the direction of forces detected by the Pave mover14. At the end of their ballistic flight, they dropped terminally guided sub-munitions which were then directed toward the tanks individually.

One of the system’s innovations was that the missiles themselves had a fairly simple guiding system. Because of this, however, they were liable to deviate from their course. So, through the intervention of the ground control station where operators followed the entire tactical situation on their screens – including the progression of enemy forces and the missiles fired at them – Pave mover also had to be able to send instructions to rectify the trajectory of the missiles. Another vector, the NV-150 cruise missile, was also proposed at the time.



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