Stable Nuclear Zero: The Vision and Its Implications for Disarmament Policy by Sverre Lodgaard

Stable Nuclear Zero: The Vision and Its Implications for Disarmament Policy by Sverre Lodgaard

Author:Sverre Lodgaard [Lodgaard, Sverre]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781138690608
Google: -AaljwEACAAJ
Goodreads: 29525238
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2016-08-16T00:00:00+00:00


Verifying that the disarmed remain disarmed

The scale of an abolition undertaking cannot be underestimated. There are reportedly still about 20,000 nuclear weapons in existence worldwide, several thousand of which are awaiting dismantlement in Russia and the USA (International Panel on Fissile Materials 2011, 4). Precise figures are not in the public domain.

Exactly how long it would take to dismantle one weapon is not a matter discussed in the public domain, but could take anything between three and 36 working days (Munger 2012). In addition, how many weapons are currently being dismantled per year is not known. Data from the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) indicate that the USA is dismantling on average 580 weapons per year, and the Russian Federation some 200 to 300. At the peak of the dismantlement campaign in the 1990s, the USA managed to dismantle some 1,300 weapons per year (International Panel on Fissile Materials 2011, 5).

It is unknown whether such a campaign can be sustained today. Anecdotal evidence indicates that US dismantlement sites are running close to capacity and that storage space for dismantled components is becoming scarce. Assuming that no expansions to existing dismantlement sites were necessary – probably an unrealistic assumption – it would, at present dismantlement rates, take some 15 years to fully dismantle the US arsenal and about four decades to remove the Russian arsenal. Considering that some weapons will take longer than others to dismantle, an implementation timeline of at least two decades does not sound unlikely.

To speed up the process, existing disposal facilities may need to be expanded, modified to enable inspections, or new facilities will need to be built. While no precise projections are available, complete nuclear disarmament is likely to be a lengthy process, which also will require significant funding.

The disarmament process will not end simply because there are no more weapons in existence. Weapons-usable material will also need to be dealt with. According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), there are in the world approximately 1,390 metric tonnes of uranium enriched to over 90 per cent in the isotope U-235. In addition, world stockpiles of non-civilian plutonium are about 230 metric tonnes. How much of this material resides in weapons is not known at present. In addition, these figures are subject to significant uncertainties.

From this material, more than 80,000 nuclear weapons could theoretically be produced (or about 60,000 additional weapons). Global stockpiles are currently shrinking as the USA and Russia move to eliminate excess material (ibid., 8, 16). However, while some countries are getting rid of their stocks, or holding them in reserve, others may still add to the balance.

Much as with dismantling warheads, reducing material stocks is not a cheap endeavour. An indication of how costly this can be is gleaned by quickly examining efforts to date. Under the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), the United States and Russia have each pledged to dispose of 34 metric tonnes of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The price tag on the Russian side alone is estimated to be approximately US$3.



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