Self, Reason, and Freedom by Christofidou Andrea;

Author:Christofidou, Andrea;
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 1104737
Publisher: Routledge

Descartes' solution to the problem of error

The thesis I have so far formulated is in need of further refinement before it becomes fully determinate, though one thing is already clear: Descartes' accepted solution to the problem of error is complex and involves a number of steps.

A resolution to the internal inconsistency

We can begin by offering an answer to the two-fold question we left pending at p. 127: ‘How can I reconcile God's veracity and supreme perfection with: (i) my finiteness; and (ii) my falling into error?’ It has been shown that none of my faculties is faulty or defective; they are simply not supremely perfect, only perfect of their kind. In the case of the will, its wide scope is more in terms of its application (see p. 137). As to my imperfection, this is constitutive of my being finite and thus lacking in many perfections. But although I am finite, my nature itself is not defective, nor is it the source of error which lies in the concurrence of the two faculties (though not every concurrence results in error).

What about the cause of error? It was suggested earlier that a clue must be in the proviso: “while using [my faculty] correctly”. The cause of error is traced to the inappropriate use I make of the combination of those faculties; it lies in the incorrect use of the will, in the operation of the will “in so far as it proceeds from me”, not in the faculty of the will, “nor even in its operation, in so far as it depends on [God]” (AT VII 60). The immediate implication is that, though the operation of the will, like everything else, is bestowed by God, its appropriate use “is up to me.”19 If this is correct, it now transpires that no reconciliation is needed between God's supreme perfection and my falling into error, since neither the source (at least for the moment), nor the cause of error is dependent on God, or on anything endowed by God. The immediate question, however, is: What of God's responsibility for bestowing on me two disparate faculties in full knowledge that it is in their concurrence that the source of error can be found? I return to this at pp. 138–40, below.

At present, it is through this line of reasoning that Descartes manages to resolve the internal inconsistency (see p. 127), by rendering the triadic set of propositions consistent. The apparently offending proposition was the third: my judgements are (often) erroneous. Descartes can hold on to the truth of all three propositions without inconsistency because the cause of erroneous judgements lies in the misuse of the will. But that is hardly God's failing. God has not deceived me or treated me unjustly; the fact that I can attain knowledge (and avoid error, as we shall see) is a perfection endowed by God. The two faculties, understanding and willing are exonerated since neither is defective, neither in its true nature inclines to falsehood, or error. This last claim will be crucial to our assessment of the nature of the will in Chapter 7.

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