Security Sector Reconstruction and Reform in Peace Support Operations by Michael Brzoska Law David

Author:Michael Brzoska, Law David [Michael Brzoska, Law David]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781138981560
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2016-06-15T00:00:00+00:00

UNMISET’s Role: 2002–04

While UNTAET deserves criticism for the aforementioned shortcomings, UNMISET deserves harsh censure for its handling of police development in 2002–2004. Despite the benefit of the experiences and lessons learned of 1999–2002 and the blunt words of reports by King’s College London, the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) and other surveys, UNMISET failed to undertake any meaningful and well-conceived institutional development initiatives. Its ham-fisted response to the JAM’s recommendations arguably did more to hamper the PNTL’s progress than to cultivate it.17

Despite its Security Council mandate to develop the PNTL, the CIVPOL deployment’s design and planning simply did not consider or reflect the realities of capacity building and institutional training. All but 0.1 per cent of the CIVPOL officers were recruited regardless of their experience in developing police forces. Out of an approved CIVPOL force level of 1,250, only two posts were concerned with police service development per se: a ‘training adviser’ and an ‘institution and capacity building adviser’; the latter, critical post was held by an entirely unqualified individual.18 The UNMISET mission included 100 international civilian advisers to assist and advise key ministries and the justice sector.19 Despite the PNTL’s manifest institutional shortcomings and a lengthy process to prioritize and define the terms of reference for these 100 advisory positions, none of them had anything to do with internal security or police service development. Even after the JAM report was released (see below), the UN still did not develop any type of institutional development plan for the PNTL.

The CIVPOL Commissioner reported to the SRSG on policing-related operational matters and to the Deputy SRSG on PNTL development issues. In the aftermath of the JAM report, the Deputy SRSG’s office became heavily involved in PNTL development issues, despite the lack of institution-building expertise and experience among its staff. Indeed, during much of UNMISET, PNTL development was the remit of altogether ill-qualified personnel in the Deputy SRSG’s office.20 Beyond the individual efforts of a relatively small number of dedicated CIVPOLs, UNMISET’s efforts included its patchy involvement in the Joint Assessment Mission of November 2002, its inept management of the so-called Institution and Capacity Building Committee, and the organizing of two large policing conferences of highly dubious efficacy.

In late 2002, mounting concern over the PNTL’s lack of progress led to the organization of a Joint Assessment Mission to examine ways in which to improve and accelerate police service development. The JAM was nominally a collaborative effort of the UN, the East Timorese government and key donor countries such as Australia, the UK and the United States. The JAM’s work was undermined by minimal cooperation from the UN Police Commissioner and the failure of UN headquarters to dispatch a suitably qualified representative from CPD.21 Given that these two were the nominal JAM co-team leaders, other mission members had to assume de facto control of the mission’s planning, inquiries and deliberations. Planning for the mission, assigned to CIVPOL, was non-existent until two junior staffers from UNDP and the Deputy SRSG’s office assumed responsibility at the last minute.

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