Responses to Naturalism by Paul Giladi;

Author:Paul Giladi;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)
Published: 2019-07-19T16:00:00+00:00

Notes

1. Cf. Merricks (2000), Unger (1979a, 1979b), Inwagen (1990).

2. The term “manifest image” was coined by Sellars (1963). It is used in a different way in this paper.

3. Cf. Jackson (1998).

4. For the claim that idealism is committed to the metaphilosophical view that knowledge makes a difference to what is known and that this is what is at stake between idealists and realists, see Prichard 1909: 115–119.

5. Jackson 1998: 4.

6. Austin 1962: 8.

7. In the philosophy of mind, where the question many philosophers address concerns the place of mind in nature, the location problem tends to be referred to as the “placement problem”. This is essentially the same problem that arises in two contexts: that of contemporary analytic metaphysics, where the major concern has been that of how to accommodate ordinary objects in the scientific world view, and in contemporary philosophy of mind, where the major concern has been that of how to accommodate the mind in the scientific world view.

8. Jackson 1998: 5.

9. Ibid., p. 28.

10. Ibid., p. 25.

11. Ibid.

12. De Caro and Voltolini 2010: 71.

13. I am here using the term ‘science’ in the Latin sense (Scientia) to mean simply a form or way of knowing.

14. Cf. Tse (2019).

15. For further on this, see D’Oro (2018).

16. In this respect, the defence of the sui generis nature of the manifest image canvassed here is not the same as that advocated by liberal naturalists such as John McDowell (1996). The latter advocates a softening of the scientific image which is not required by the view I defend for which there is only one sort of naturalism, not two. Cf. McDowell (1998).

17. Cf. Smithson (2019).

18. Cf. Levine (1983).

19. Cf. Block (1997a, 1997b).

20. For an account of how this conception of the role of conceptual analysis in metaphysics informs debates in the philosophy of mind, see D’Oro et al. (2019).

21. The relation of supervenience has been used in service of a non-reductivist agenda by Davidson (1980); while others, such as Kim (1995, 2000) have denied that the relation of supervenience can support non-reductivism.

22. Kim (2000).

23. Collingwood [1940] 1998, Ch. XXX.

24. I discuss this further in D’Oro (2018a).

25. Collingwood [1940] 1998: 4.

26. Cf. 1997a, 1997b.

27. Dray (1957, 1958, 1963).

28. Hempel (1942).

29. Cf. Heidegger [1927] 1962: § 43.

30. Ibid., §15, 32.

31. Descartes [1641] 2008: 22.

32. Ladyman and Ross (2007).

33. Heidegger [1927] 1962: § 17.

34. Cf. Thomasson (2007).

35. This is why, for example, a retailer’s marketing policy would not be improved by reclassifying its stock according to scientific descriptions (the molecular structure of wood or iron) rather than manifest descriptions (dining room furniture, office furniture) for scientific classifications would be of little use to the person searching for an office chair or a dining table.

36. While Thomasson’s attempt to defend ordinary object by invoking the relation of entailment differs in some important respects from Heidegger, her argument for making ontology easy (Thomasson 2015) has more in common with the idealist/pragmatist approach defended here than this disagreement suggests.

37. For a similar claim, see Smithson (2019).

38. Viz., Ryle 1949, Ch.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.