Philosophy of Suffering by David Bain;Michael Brady;Jennifer Corns;

Author:David Bain;Michael Brady;Jennifer Corns;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)
Published: 2020-03-06T16:00:00+00:00

ART: separating desire and frustrated desire

Jacobson too may object that pain is not a BMA, for what is bad is not what provides us with the motivational reason to change the world. What is bad is the complex condition of a subjectively frustrated desire, that is, the perception that the bodily condition obtains plus the desire that it not obtain. What is motivational is the second component of the complex, namely, the desire that the bodily disorder not obtain. Thus, there is no one attitude that is motivational and bad. The frustrated desire is bad, but it is not motivational. The desire alone is motivational, but not bad. The complex is bad, and it motivates us to change the world in virtue of the desire that composes it.

Indeed, on this construal, there seems to be no conflict of reasons. The argument I presented above concludes that if a BMA is a reason to eliminate itself, then it cannot, trivially, be a reason to bring about any change in the world. A subjectively frustrated desire can, however, be eliminated by eliminating the perception that the bodily condition obtains, instead of the desire that it not obtain. Thus, we can eliminate the frustrated desire without losing the world-directed reason, that is, the desire that the bodily disorder not obtain.

However, eliminating the complex condition by eliminating the perception that the bodily condition obtains does not leave the desire intact. On the contrary, the elimination of the perception that the bodily condition obtains eliminates the desire that it not obtain as well. For if p is already the case, the desire that p should (and tends to) disappear; it may survive as a favoring attitude towards p, such as liking, but not as a motivational state towards p.

This is part of the difference between beliefs and desires regarding their opposing direction of fit. Beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit, such that in cases of misfit, it is their “fault”—they should be discarded. Desires have a world-to-mind direction of fit, such that in cases of misfit the world is to blame—it should be changed to fit the desire. Conversely, in cases of fit, the belief should continue while the desire should disappear. The desire motivates us to change the world only when there is (or seems to be) a misfit between its content and the world. That is, only when it is or seems to be not yet satisfied but—to some extent—frustrated. Any desire is, then, subjectively frustrated (to some extent). This means that as soon as you want things, according to ART, you’re in a bad situation (to that extent).

It might be argued that the generalized conclusion that any desire is subjectively frustrated involves a misconception of the notion of frustration. A subjectively frustrated desire is not just the conjunction of desiring that p and an awareness (or seeming awareness) that not-p. Being frustrated means realizing (or seeming to realize) that the desire cannot be satisfied, or that all efforts to fulfill it are in vain.

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