On Tyranny by Strauss Leo; Gourevitch Victor; Roth Michael S

Author:Strauss, Leo; Gourevitch, Victor; Roth, Michael S. [Strauss, Leo]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: University of Chicago Press

The question of principle that remains to be resolved is whether or not the wise man, in his capacity as a wise man, can do anything but talk about a political “ideal,” and whether he wants to leave the realm of “utopia” and “general” or even “abstract ideas,” and to confront concrete reality by giving the tyrant “realistic” advice.

In order to answer this twofold question, we must carefully distinguish between the wise man properly so called, and the philosopher, for the situation is far from being the same in the two cases. In order to simplify things, I will speak only about the latter. Anyway, neither Xenophon nor Strauss seem to admit the existence of the wise man properly so called.

By definition, the philosopher does not possess Wisdom (that is to say full self-consciousness, or—in fact—omniscience); but (a Hegelian would have to specify: in a given epoch) he is more advanced on the road that leads to Wisdom than any non-philosopher or “uninitiate,” including the tyrant. Also by definition, the philosopher is supposed to “dedicate his life” to the quest for Wisdom.

Taking this twofold definition as our point of departure, we must ask ourselves: “can the philosopher govern men or participate in their governance, and does he want to do so; in particular, can and does he want to do so by giving the tyrant concrete political advice?”

Let us first ask ourselves whether he can do so, or, more precisely, whether, as a philosopher, he enjoys any advantage over the “uninitiate” (and the tyrant is an uninitiate) when it comes to questions of government.

I believe that the negative answer that is usually given rests on a misunderstanding, on a total misconception of what philosophy is and of what the philosopher is.

For the purposes at hand, I need only recall three traits that are distinctive of the philosopher in contrast to the “uninitiate.” In the first place, the philosopher is more expert in the art of dialectic or discussion in general: he sees better than his “uninitiate” interlocutor the inadequacies of the latter’s argument, and he knows better how to make the most of his own arguments and how to refute the objections of others. In the second place, the art of dialectic enables the philosopher to free himself of prejudices to a greater extent than the “uninitiate”: he is thus more open to reality as it is, and he is less dependent on the way in which men, at a given historical moment, imagine it to be. Finally, in the third place, since he is more open to the real, he comes closer to the concrete than does the “uninitiate,” who confines himself to abstractions, without, however, being aware of their abstract, even unreal, character.2

Now these three distinctive traits of the philosopher are so many advantages he in principle enjoys over the “uninitiate” when it comes to governing.

Strauss points out that Hiero, realizing Simonides’s dialectical superiority, mistrusts him, seeing in him a potential and formidable rival. And I think that Hiero is right.

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