Nicomachean Ethics (The New Hackett Aristotle) by Aristotle

Nicomachean Ethics (The New Hackett Aristotle) by Aristotle

Author:Aristotle [Aristotle]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781624661679
Publisher: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Published: 2014-02-26T05:00:00+00:00


Book II

Note 136

Character: EE II 2 1220b5–7 defines character as “a quality of soul that, though nonrational itself, is capable of obedience to reason by being in accord with a prescriptive reason.”

Note 137

Teaching: Teaching is essentially a linguistic activity: “Certain animals share at once in some learning and teaching, some from each other, some from human beings, these are the ones that have hearing—not just those that hear sounds but those that further perceive the differences between signs” (HA IX 1 608a17–21; also Pol. I 2 1253a1–18, Po. 19 1456b5–7). In the full sense, it involves formal instruction in a craft or science: “Teaching is what those people do who state the causes of each thing” (Met. I 2 982a29–30); “An indication of the one who knows, as opposed to the one who does not know, is his capacity to teach. That is why we think craft knowledge to be more like scientific knowledge than experience is, since craftsmen can teach, while experienced people cannot” (I 1 981b7–10); “Teaching is argument (logos) in accord with scientific knowledge” (Rh. I 1 1355a26). Experience and time: Compare VI 8 1142a11–16.

Note 138

Stone . . . fire: Stone or earth and fire are two of the four sublunary elements Aristotle recognizes; the other two are water and air. Each of these has a rectilinear movement that is natural to it. Thus earth naturally moves down toward the center of the universe, and fire naturally moves upward to the universe’s boundary (Cael. IV 4). Unless compelled or restrained, then, a stone will move downward, fire upward.

Note 139

Brought to completion: A virtue is a sort of completion (Ph. VII 3 246b2), so that by acquiring the virtues we complete our functions and ourselves (NE I 7 1098a12–15).

Note 140

Various (alln): An illogical but common use of allos (for example, Plato, Grg. 473d1, Phd. 62a2–3) not to mean “other,” since this would carry the false suggestion that virtues are themselves crafts, but to mean “various.” Also II 4 1105b1.

Note 141

We become just people by doing just actions: “Since all capacities are either innate (like the perceptual capacities) or come about by habit (like that of flute playing) or through learning (like that of the crafts), in the case of some capacities—namely, those that come about by habit and by reason—previous practice is necessary for their possession but this is not necessary for the ones that are not of this sort and that involve being affected” (Met. IX 5 1047b31–35).

Note 142

Constitution (politeia): A politeia is “a sort of way of life (bios) of a city” (Pol. IV 11 1295a40–b1); “a certain organization of a city’s inhabitants” (III 1 1274b38) or of its various offices, “above all, the one with control of everything” (III 6 1278b8–10). “It is by seeking happiness in different ways and by different means that individual groups of people create different ways of life and different constitutions” (VII 8 1328a41–b2).

Note 143

Confidence (tharrein): “Confidence is expectation of safety accompanied by the appearance that it is close at hand and that frightening things either do not exist or are far off” (Rh.



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