Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind by Lumer Christoph;

Author:Lumer, Christoph; [Lumer, Christoph]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: De Gruyter, Inc.
Published: 2014-09-02T16:00:00+00:00

1. A Challenge to the Intentional-causalist Conception of Action and the Aim of this Chapter

The aim of this chapter is to defend the traditional, intentional-causalist conception of action against a challenge raised by recent neuropsychological theories, in particular by Daniel Wegner’s theory.

The traditional conception of action is intentional-causalist: An action consists of a behaviour which is caused (in a non-deviant way) by a respective intention, where this intention itself is actually or possibly the result of a deliberation which aims at fulfilling our desires.26 This conception of action expresses what is valuable in actions and makes up the foundations of practical rationality, freedom of decision and freedom of action as well as of responsibility. The value consists in the fact that a mental structure, which we may call the “ego”, i.e. that part of our mind which is consciously accessible, with which we identify and which we consider to be the kernel of our self, controls our behaviour in a rational way and, via the consequences of our behaviour, also some segment of the outer and inner world. Parts of the ego are, among others, our desires, our knowledge about options and consequences and the deliberation mechanism, which tries to determine the option that best fulfils our desires and, accordingly, establishes an intention. The intention then is the hinge between deliberation and execution: it is actually or possibly the result of a deliberation, and, if everything runs smoothly, it causes the intended behaviour (Lumer 2013). Please note, an ego conceived in this way is not a homunculus but a mental structure in which certain processes occur; intentions are one group of results of such processes. The ego does not act like an agent but it does, among other things, generate our intentions.

The American psychologist Daniel Wegner has developed a theory of the “experience of conscious will”, i.e. a theory of how we come to believe that we act, with which he has defended the strong claim that the conscious will is an illusion. This theory as well as the claim have found wide diffusion and often acceptance among psychologists, neuroscientists, the general public and, though perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent, philosophers. Together with the work of Benjamin Libet it is probably the currently most influential attack on the traditional concept of action.

This chapter discusses the main and direct way in which this theory challenges the traditional conception, namely the theoretical model of the experience of conscious will (as well as its substantiation), by which Wegner defends his claim of the illusion of the conscious will. This claim itself is a very radical attack on the intentional-causalist concept of action, which questions the causal efficacy of intentions (or their physiological underpinnings) altogether. If it were true, the basis of our ideas of practical rationality, responsibility and freedom would be entirely undermined. The following discussion tries to show that that part of the model of the experience of conscious will which should sustain the illusion thesis is entirely unfounded.

Wegner’s theory and,

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