Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action by Jürgen Habermas

Author:Jürgen Habermas [Habermas, Jürgen]
Language: eng
Format: azw3
Publisher: Wiley
Published: 2015-10-07T04:00:00+00:00

Notes

1. A Maclntyre, After Virtue (London, 1981), p. 52. M. Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York, 1974), chapter 1, pp. 3–57.

2. R. Wimmer, Universalisierung in der Ethik (Frankfurt, 1980).

3. W. K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1973), chapter 6.

4. See chapters 1 and 8 of my Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols. (Boston, 1984, 1987).

5. P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment (London, 1974). It should be noted that Strawson is concerned with a different theme.

6. Nietzsche too saw a genetic link between the ressentiment of those who have been injured or insulted and a universalistic morality of sympathy. On this point, see J. Habermas, “The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment,” in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 106–130.

7. Strawson (1974), p. 9.

8. Strawson (1974), p. 9.

9. Strawson (1974), p. 11ff. Strawson here refers to a determinism that exposes the competence actors impute to each other as deceptive.

10. Strawson (1974), p. 15.

11. On the differentiation of possible answers to these three classes of questions, see L. Krüger, “Über das Verhältnis von Wissenschaftlichkeit und Rationalität,” in H. P. Duerr, ed., Der Wissenschaftler und das Irrationale (Frankfurt, 1981), vol. 2., pp. 91ff.

12. Strawson (1974), p. 22.

13. Strawson (1974), p. 23.

14. S. Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 121ff.

15. Toulmin (1970), p. 125.

16. K. Nielsen, “On Moral Truth,” in N. Rescher, ed., Studies in Moral Philosophy (Oxford, 1968), pp. 9ff.

17. A. R. White, Truth (New York, 1971), p. 61.

18. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1903), especially chapter 1.

19. G. E. Moore, “A Reply to My Critics,” in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (Evanston, 1942).

20. Toulmin (1970), p. 28.

21. A. J. Ayer, “On the Analysis of Moral Judgments,” in M. Munitz, ed., A Modern Introduction to Ethics (New York, 1958), p. 537.

22. Maclntyre (1981), p. 12. See also C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (London, 1945), chapter 2.

23. R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952).

24. Hare (1952), p. 3.

25. Compare the interesting remarks on “complete justification” by Hare: “The truth is that, if asked to justify as completely as possible any decision, we have to bring in both effects—to give content to the decision—and principles, and the effects in general of observing those principles, and so on, until we have satisfied our inquirer. Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of its effects, together with a complete account of the principles which it observed, and the effects of observing those principles, for of course it is the effects (what obeying them in fact consists in) which give content to the principles too. Thus, if pressed to justify a decision completely, we have to give a complete specification of the way of life of which it is a part.” Hare (1952), pp. 68ff. Following Max Weber, Hans Albert has developed a different version of decisionism on the basis of Popper’s critical rationalism, most recently in his Fehlbare Vernunft (Tübingen, 1980).

26. On the

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