Military Power and Politics in Black Africa by Simon Baynham

Author:Simon Baynham [Baynham, Simon]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780367677268
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2021-05-12T00:00:00+00:00

The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) : 1980–1985

At first glance, there are several similarities in Mozambique and Zimbabwe’s post-independence military development. For instance, both countries hold that South Africa is their principal external enemy and they tend to see a South African hand in many of the internal problems they experience. Yet, despite these and other similarities, Zimbabwe’s military development has been influenced by a set of circumstances radically different from that of Mozambique. Considerations of space do not allow for a discussion of the entire range of conditions influencing Zimbabwe’s development since 1980; for our purposes, however, three conditions are highly relevant.

First, the conflict in Zimbabwe ended in an election which did much to clarify the political power distribution in the country. To contest the first election, ZANU and ZAPU campaigned as political parties and in the process demonstrated separate bases of political power. ZAPU further demonstrated that it was a minority party with a power base primarily in Matabeleland, while ZANU showed its strength as majority party by capturing virtually all the parliamentary seats in the rest of Zimbabwe.57 That ZANU has been unable to make any electoral headway in Matabeleland since 1980 or, put another way, that the political support bases of the major black political parties have hardened since 1980, is of course a cause of strife, but the important point is there is no doubt as to the breadth and legitimacy of ZANU’s electoral base. Second, although the Mugabe regime’s management of the economy certainly has not satisfied all pre-1980 expectations regarding jobs, income or land-related issues, a combination of the regime’s cautious and pragmatic economic policy, the resilience of economic structures inherited from the pre-1980 period, and the lifting of sanctions have – in spite of the drought only recently broken in Zimbabwe – provided a reasonbly stable economic environment.58 There is indeed considerable continuity between pre- and post-1980 economic policy, particularly as regards the priority accorded to the manufacturing sector,59 and this continuity has done much to allay whites’ and foreign investors’ fears about impending economic collapse under ZANU political leadership. Third, the Mugabe regime inherited a set of state institutions whose powers vastly increased during the UDI period. With the removal of discriminatory hiring practices and the accelerated promotion of black and especially ZANU-oriented public servants, the public service for ZANU has become a valued means to manage the economy, distribute patronage, and to strengthen its power base.60 Public pronouncements in Zimbabwe have often tended to create the expectation of a radical break with the past, but in view of the preceding discussion it is clear that considerable continuity in fact exists between pre- and post-1980 Zimbabwe. It is against this backdrop of relative overall stability that military development has taken place.

In 1980 Zimbabwe’s immediate military problems seemed daunting. During the war the Rhodesian Army had increased to 14,000 regulars, assisted by about 60,000 reservists and auxiliary and para-military forces.61 ZANU and ZAPU together numbered between 35,000 and 40,000 guerrillas.62 Portions of these

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