Husserl's Ethics and Practical Intentionality by Susi Ferrarello;

Husserl's Ethics and Practical Intentionality by Susi Ferrarello;

Author:Susi Ferrarello;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Bloomsbury UK
Published: 2016-02-15T00:00:00+00:00


4.2.3 Substratum and the foreign activity of presentations: restating the theory of parts and whole

At this point I will return to the question posed at the beginning of this section: How, in a flux of consciousness, does an individual, or do individuals, come to be apprehended? How is it that in this flux we always remain the same? How is that in apprehending A, the ego is consciousness of getting to know S? How is it that as we proceed to apprehend S through a P, A, delta, and so forth, S still remains dominant? To answer these questions we need to explicitly translate Husserl’s static theory of parts and wholes into genetic language.

In section 47 of the sixth Logical Investigation Husserl used the notion of fusion to partially describe the relationship of co-foundation between parts and whole. As previously mentioned, fusion is an important word of Husserl’s to refer to the crossroads of temporal streams. The term fusion, borrowed from Stumpf, is employed by Husserl to signify a form of atemporal placeless synthesis of sensuous and categorical intuitions carried out by a ‘foreign’ synthetic activity. ‘The unity of perception does not arise through our own synthetic activity […] it requires no articulation and hence no actual linkage. The unity of perception comes into being as a straightforward unity, as an immediate fusion of part-intentions, without the addition of new act-intentions’ (cited in Mohanty 2008: 165; also Hua XL, §42). Husserl will also draw upon the concept of fusion to explain the relationship between parts and whole from a static and genetic viewpoint.

In section 118 of Ideas I, a section entitled the ‘Syntheses of Consciousness’, Husserl distinguishes between two forms of synthetic unity: a passive and an active one. The passive and lower form of synthesis is not spontaneous, but requires a passive process of overlapping and discreet syntheses aimed at the identification or individuation of the manifold that determines the hyletic X. The active form of syntheses is spontaneous, categorial and unifies higher-order unities, atemporal ideals. In Ideas II section 9, Husserl specifies that this latter form of synthesis is only found in higher level objects. Such objects are higher level objects because they are built upon multiple sensuous layers.

As a matter of fact, in the Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis section 58, Husserl is compelled to add the expression ‘substrate’ in revisiting his theory of parts and whole to explain how an object comes to our attention as a whole. In general the term substrate defines what exercises a unitary affection upon the ego, or what emerges in an attentive regard. ‘A substrate can stem from passivity or from activity’ (Hua XL, 42; En. tr. 312). The substrate that comes from active constitution is that formation in which the ego constitutes itself and its objects by making ‘what was already constituted an explicit object’ (Hua XL, 42; En. tr. 312). This occurs because it pursues an affection or exercises its determination. In actively constituting this substrate, the



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