Fundamentals of Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy by Ma Lin; van Brakel Jaap;

Author:Ma, Lin; van Brakel, Jaap;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: State University of New York Press
Published: 2016-11-28T05:00:00+00:00

Qing 情 versus Emotion(s)

Certain forms of reverse geyi show similarities with transcendental pretence, in particular when Chinese and Western concepts are too easily identified and hence essentialized. This kind of transcendental pretence is still apparent when authors (Western or Chinese) provide tables in which classical Chinese concepts/characters are listed together with their supposedly corresponding words in Western languages. An example of such a table, including translations of sixty-four Chinese characters and expressions,33 can be found in the translation of Zhang Dainian’s 张岱年 Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy, translated and edited by Edmund Ryden (2002).34 Such tables misleadingly suggest that, for instance, de 德 has the same meaning for all Chinese literati and “virtue” has the same meaning for all Western scholars. Moreover, it suggests that de 德 and virtue share the same meaning (whatever it is), on which all scholars are in agreement and are trying to pin down. One might retort that an experienced scholar would not be misled by such tables, being fully aware of the complexities of conveying the meaning of classical Chinese notions in a modern Western language (or modern Chinese for that matter). But the essentialization is also explicit in the main text of the English translation of Zhang’s book. For example, Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 312–230) is cited as saying: 35

The liking, disliking, joy, anger, grief, happiness of human nature are what is meant by “emotions.” (383)

Concerning this passage, Zhang remarks (in the English translation): “This states clearly that the six attributes [of human nature] cited are to be understood as ‘emotions’” (Zhang and Ryden: 384).36 However, Xunzi is not saying anything about “‘emotions’.” He is saying that the six “好惡喜怒哀樂” are qing 情.37 In the Chinese original the discourse concerns qing and the association with “emotion” does not arise. Also consider the following passage in which Zhang cites Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), defining qing 情 as:38

compassion, shame, yielding, distinguishing right and wrong (Zhang: 387)

ce-yin, xiu-wu, ci-rang, shi-fei, qing-ye

恻隐、羞恶、辞让、是非、情也

Concerning Zhu Xi, Zhang comments: “Zhu Xi could not avoid, particularly in the fourth case [i.e., shifei judgments], confusing the rational and the emotional spheres” (387).39 Zhang seems to unconsciously take for granted that the list of 情 qing is a list of (Western) emotions. This gives rise to the accusation that Zhu Xi was confused. This example illustrates the weakness of the method of reverse geyi. Its excesses too easily lead to essentialized projection of (undeconstructed) ge on yi.40

The rather recent Western dichotomy of reason and emotion is too easily taken for granted when interpreting classical Chinese texts. For example, Marchal (204) says: “Confucians don’t draw a clear distinction between reason and emotion,” taking the reason/emotion dichotomy as “given.”41 Perhaps such distinctions do not exist in (behind) classical Chinese texts. Hence, it does not make sense to speculate about authors thinking about or interrelating these distinctions. Chinese scholars in classical times are not mixing descriptive and normative issues, as Fraser (2012: 355) suggests.

Santangelo (2005) made some relevant comments concerning the dissimilarities in the large between Chinese

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