Exporting the Bomb by Kroenig Matthew.;

Author:Kroenig, Matthew.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 978-0-8014-5767-8
Publisher: Lightning Source Inc. (Tier 3)

China’s Superpower Dependence

The United States, a global superpower, intervened in an attempt to prevent Chinese-Pakistani nuclear cooperation. China was able to continue providing sensitive nuclear assistance, despite U.S. objections, because China enjoyed superpower independence.

Beginning in the early 1970s, the United States led an international effort to bring China into the international nonproliferation regime.16 For decades the United States applied diplomatic pressure in a failed attempt to convince China to join the IAEA, the NPT, and the NSG. China was unwilling to join formal institutions that placed restrictions on the conditions under which it could export nuclear technologies. In the mid-1980s and early 1990s, U.S. officials were aware of, and concerned about, Chinese nuclear exports to Pakistan, Iran, and Algeria. In response, the United States implemented an approach that combined carrots and sticks to dissuade China from exporting sensitive nuclear material and technology. In the 1980s, the United States offered China civilian nuclear technology, conventional weapons systems, military technology, advanced computers, and telecommunications technology, in exchange for an agreement to meet U.S. nonproliferation standards. It may seem puzzling that the United States was willing to provide nuclear assistance to China, a potential rival state. These were, however, nonsensitive civilian nuclear transfers, which would not have directly strengthened China’s nuclear weapons program. More important, however, they were part of an overall attempt at influencing China’s nuclear nonproliferation behavior. U.S. attempts at influence continued with the 1985 Congressional Resolution of Approval of the U.S.-China Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, which threatened to cut off U.S. nuclear-related exports to China if China failed to comply with U.S. nonproliferation requirements on its nuclear exports. In addition, the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act required a cutoff of U.S. financing to any country which “has willfully aided and abetted any non-nuclear weapon state” to acquire HEU or plutonium.17

U.S. pressure did not, however, prevent China from providing sensitive nuclear assistance to Pakistan. China was able to continue with the sensitive nuclear transactions in part because it enjoyed superpower independence. China had acquired a nuclear weapons arsenal in 1964, granting it security independence long before it initiated the sensitive nuclear transfers to Pakistan. Furthermore, China did not possess a formal defense pact with either the Soviet Union or the United States, meaning that China was not relying on a superpower to provide for its security. In fact, during the Cold War, China maintained enough independence from the superpowers that it was able to switch from one side to the other, and back again.

Because China did not depend on a superpower to provide security, it was able to continue the sensitive nuclear transfers, despite superpower pressure. China probably considered the international displeasure that would result from the provision of sensitive nuclear assistance, but the prospect of international condemnation was not enough to deter the sensitive nuclear transfers to Pakistan.

In recent years, China has come to exercise more restraint in its nuclear exports. China joined the IAEA in 1984, the NPT in 1992, and the NSG in 2004. China has also adopted

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