Explanation, Laws, and Causation by Wang Wei;

Author:Wang, Wei;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor and Francis
Published: 2017-03-30T16:00:00+00:00

Section 2 Ceteris paribus lost?

John Earman2 is a distinguished University Professor Emeritus in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, specializing in the history and philosophy of physics, as well as the general philosophy of science. He received a PhD degree from Princeton University in 1968 and then taught at UCLA, Rockefeller University, and the University of Minnesota. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and served as the President of the Philosophy of Science Association (2000–2001). In his paper titled “Ceteris Paribus Lost?” Earman – along with co-authors Roberts and Smith – has launched perhaps the fiercest attacks against CP laws. With the contention that there should be no room for CP laws in physics, these arguments can be characterized as follows:

(i) Appealing to examples taken from physics. It seems to ERS that in order for a “real” CP law to be interesting, its CP clause must be ineliminable, and the range of this clause cannot be made explicit. As they state: “Otherwise, the CP clause is merely a function of laziness: Though we could eliminate the CP clause in favor of a precise, known conditional, we choose not to do so” (Earman, Roberts, and Smith, 2002, pp. 283–284). They argue that CP clauses can easily be eliminated by known conditions if we use scientific language properly.

(ii) Confusing Hempel’s provisos with ceteris paribus clauses. ERS think that Hempel’s central concern “is not the alleged need to save law statements from falsity by hedging them with CP clauses, but rather the problem of applying to a concrete physical system…. [T]he conditions of the provisos are conditions for the validity of the application, not conditions for the truth of the law statements of the theory” (Earman, Roberts, and Smith, 2002, p. 285). Thus, they would accept Hempel’s provisos but reject CP clauses.

(iii) Confusing laws with differential equations of evolution type.3 ERS propose a distinction between a theory consisting of a set of non-hedged laws and the application of a theory that might be hedged (in an easily stateable way). They argue that those examples provided by CP law proponents are just differential equations of evolution type: “But differential equations of evolution type are not laws; rather, they represent Hempel’s applications of a theory to a specific case. They are derived using (unhedged) laws along with non-nomic modeling assumptions that fit (often only approximately) the specific case one is modelling. Because they depend on such non-nomic assumptions, they are not laws” (Earman, Roberts, and Smith, 2002, p. 286).

(iv) Opposing Cartwright’s view of component forces. ERS raise two objections to Nancy Cartwright’s local antirealism about component forces on two counts: (a) in many cases the component forces are measurable; (b) it is logically unclear to conclude that something is not occurrent just because it is not measurable (Earman, Roberts, and Smith, 2002, p. 287). Thus, ERS appear to propose a local realism about component forces to support their (local) realism about the (component) laws.

(v) Opposing Cartwright’s argument from Aristotelian natures and the modern experimental method.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.