Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography by Schumann Gunnar.;

Author:Schumann, Gunnar.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)
Published: 2019-05-22T16:00:00+00:00

Figure 7.2 Objecto-Causalism

Objecto-causalism is just like the three-part story, except that it identifies the agent’s motivating reason with the normative reason for which she acts. It combines Dancy’s metaphysical picture of normative and motivating reasons with a causal picture of what it takes to act for a normative reason: When the agent acts for a normative reason, the reason causes the agent to act in accordance with it; this involves the agent’s being aware of that fact. The normative reason, which is also the agent’s motivating reason, causally explains her action. Another way to think about objecto-causalism is this: For an agent to act for a normative reason, the normative reason has to move her to act in accordance with it, and it can only do so if the agent “possesses” the reason, in the sense that she is aware of the fact that p, and acts in the light of that fact. Possessing the reason involves mental states of the agent’s which correctly represent the reason. What is more, these states are causally related to the fact that p, even if that relation does not fit the Humean restriction of causal relations to events. The fact is not just a reason for the agent to hold a belief, it is also a causal factor, in the same way in which in Davidson’s theory beliefs and desires are causal factors without being events that fit the Humean picture of causation (see endnote 3). The fact that p is an aspect of reality that makes a difference to whether or not the agent comes to believe it. The same holds in turn for the believing and the action. Accordingly, the fact (normative and motivating reason in one) is also a distal cause of the action.15 This does not rule out that there also distal and proximal events involved in the overall causal picture; in fact, according to the account defended below they are required to trigger the manifestation of agential capacities.

In our example, the normative reason—the fact that it is freezing outside—causes Yuki to believe that it is freezing outside. This belief (together with her desire to keep the apartment warm, etc.) then causes her to close the window. In other words, Yuki possesses the normative reason, that it is freezing outside, and can do what the reason favors on its basis: close the window. We can therefore say that Yuki closes the window because it is freezing outside. This fact is what causes her to close the window; it is her motivating reason, and we can think of her as acting for that normative reason.

Objecto-causalism, unlike the three-part story, is not affected by objections from the identity thesis, since it endorses that thesis. But what speaks in favor of the view? First off, where agents act for normative reasons, it gives the latter a robust role in the production of action. If the reasons cause the action, they are efficient causes in the weak sense of making a difference to whether or not the action is performed.

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