Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus by Irving M. Copi & Robert W. Beard

Author:Irving M. Copi & Robert W. Beard
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Routledge

Since the symbols expressing objects also express formal properties of objects, formal concepts of classes of formal properties expressed by symbols can be formed. For example, just as we can place any numerical sign under the concept of ‘Number’ and then assign it its place in the numerical series, because the numerical signs exhibit the formal property of being numbers and their internal relations to one another, so names exhibit formal properties in virtue of which they may be the values of a particular variable and in virtue of which formal concepts are formed. In the example, ‘x is darker than pink’, only certain symbols—those presenting certain properties—’satisfy’ the variable sign; thus ‘x’, in this particular way, signifies a property—or a class of properties—and by doing so, ‘shows’ that the objects that its values name fall under this particular formal concept. Wittgenstein expressed this as follows:

The propositional variable signifies the formal concept, and its values signify the objects which fall under this concept. Every variable is the sign of a formal concept. For every variable presents a constant form, which all its values possess, and which can be conceived as a formal property of these values. So the variable name ‘x’ is the proper sign of the pseudo-concept object. Wherever the word ‘object’ (‘thing’, ‘entity’, etc.) is rightly used, it is expressed in logical symbolism by the variable name. For example, in the proposition ‘there are two objects which …’, by (Ex, y) …’. Wherever it is used otherwise, i.e. as a proper concept word, there arise senseless pseudo-propositions. So one cannot, e.g. say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’ The same holds of the words ‘Complex’, ‘Fact’, ‘Function’, ‘Number’, etc. They all signify formal concepts and are presented in logical symbolism by variables, not by functions or classes (as Frege and Russell thought) The formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it (4.127–4.12721).

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.