Does God Matter? by Kraay Klaas J

Author:Kraay, Klaas J.
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)
Published: 2017-11-30T16:00:00+00:00

Objection 1

It might be objected first that we do possess a significant degree of autonomy in a Godly world. We are free to align ourselves with God’s will or even reject it, to live our lives according to His plan or to ignore it or even rebel against it.59 Conversely, even if naturalism is true, we would be far from being absolutely independent. Perhaps there is no supernatural being who sustains our existence, but we are fragile and dependent on other people, and our liberty to do as we please is severely constrained by both nature and human law.

Now it has been argued that God’s existence is simply incompatible with genuine autonomy (Rachels 1997). But my argument doesn’t depend on any such strong claim. The point is rather that there is an inherent constraint on how independent we can be in a Godly world. This, as I hope to have shown, is not a marginal difference, having a bit less of a good thing. The difference is fundamental. Children have a measure of freedom, but they aren’t independent adults. Indentured servants can have plenty of options to choose from, and can disobey or even rebel, but they aren’t free persons.

The hierarchical character of a Godly world is its most fundamental fact, the fact around which life must revolve. There is nothing remotely comparable in the naturalist world. Even slaves and servants are, nevertheless, the moral equals of their masters. And the majority of us do not live lives centred around an all-powerful superior—not, that is, if we aren’t theists. We are dependent on many others, but, again, these others are our moral equals. And the institutions and laws that constrain us still ultimately rest, if they are legitimate, on our joint wills. Finally, even if we must depend on each other, humanity as a collective isn’t constrained by any others’ will.

In any event, the comparison made in TWR needn’t be true of all atheist worlds, not even of all naturalist ones. In fact—and this marks an important difference from the antitheist argument in Kahane (2011)—although I think that TWR also applies to the actual naturalist world, it’s enough for the argument for superior atheist worlds if TWR is true with respect to some atheist worlds. In these conceivable worlds, we could be even more independent than we are here—and without an overbearing divine father in the background.

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