Diogenes the Cynic: Sayings and Anecdotes by Diogenes

Author:Diogenes [Diogenes]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Oxford World's Classics, Philosophy
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2012-03-02T08:00:00+00:00

Cyrenaic Scepticism

621 So Socrates thought in this way, and after him, the school of Aristippos of Cyrene, and later that of Ariston of Chios,* sought to assert that in pursuing philosophy, we should concentrate on the moral questions alone; for such questions are within our capacity and are useful, while those relating to nature, by contrast, are beyond our grasp, and would be of no use even if they were open to investigation.

(Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 15.62.7, 854c; G166)

622 Next there are those who claim that affections* alone are apprehensible; this is asserted by some philosophers from Cyrene. These thinkers maintained, just as if weighed down by a deep sleep, that they knew nothing whatever, unless somebody at their side should strike or prick them; for they said that when they were being burned or cut, they recognized that they were undergoing something: as to whether what was burning them was fire, or what was cutting them was iron, that they could not say.

(Aristocles, cited in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 14.19.1, 764b–d; G218)

623 The Cyrenaics say, then, that the affections are the criteria of truth, and that they alone are apprehensible and undeceptive, but that none of the things that produce the affections are apprehensible or undeceptive. That we feel the affection of whiteness, or of sweetness, can be stated, so they say, infallibly, truly, and firmly, without risk of refutation; but that the thing that produces the affection in us is white or sweet is impossible to affirm. For it is possible that we could feel the affection of whiteness under the effect of something that is not white, or the affection of sweetness under the effect of something that is not sweet. For just as one who is suffering from vertigo or jaundice receives a yellowish affection* from everything, or one suffering from ophthalmia* a reddish affection, or one who presses on his eye comes to see two images, or someone in a state of madness sees Thebes twice over* and imagines the sun to be double, so it is true that in all these cases, the people suffer some affection, such as of yellowness, redness, or redoublement, but it must be considered false that what produces these affections is yellow, red, or double, and we are thus obliged to conclude that we can grasp nothing beyond our own affections.

Thus we must posit either that affections are appearances or that the things that produce them are. Now if we say that our affections are appearances, all appearances must be said to be true and apprehensible; while if we apply that name to the things that produce the affections, then all appearances are false and inapprehensible. For the affection that occurs in us reveals nothing more than itself. It thus follows, if we are to speak the truth, that the affection alone is an appearance for us, whilst that which is outside us and produces the affection may perhaps exist, but does not appear to us.

And so

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