Desert and Virtue by Kershnar Stephen;

Author:Kershnar, Stephen;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Lexington Books
Published: 2010-08-15T00:00:00+00:00

C. Two Objections to the Character-Desert Principle

One objection to character-based desert focuses on the notion that persons are responsible for the ground of moral desert. The objector asserts that a person is morally responsible for something only if he directly plans and controls it. The idea here is that moral responsibility is a function of rational self-guidance and the latter focuses on what the agent directly plans and controls. The objector then asserts that a person neither directly plans his character traits nor directly controls them. The lack of direct planning can be seen in that a person cannot directly choose to believe or desire certain things. If character consists of beliefs, desires, and the relations between them, then a person cannot directly choose his character and probably cannot do so to any great degree. He can choose to strengthen or weaken various beliefs and desires, but this can be done only indirectly via act-focused planning. The lack of direct control can be seen in that a person cannot directly choose his character traits and can influence them indirectly by selecting various actions. The more direct link between actions and both planning and control suggests that actions alone are locus of responsibility and hence they alone are likely to ground desert.

This objection does not succeed. Nothing in the above argument prevents an agent from being responsible for things that he indirectly brings about. In addition, persons can directly plan their characters or at least certain features of it. So while they can’t always choose some of their desires (e.g., sexual orientation) and beliefs, they can and do plan to gain, lose, and modify other character traits. They do this by choosing actions, scenarios, and thoughts that reinforce or inhibit different character traits. For example, a person might eliminate the inordinate role of fear in his life by seeking out and conquering particular fears. He may learn to exercise integrity by making an effort to ensure that his acts and words align with his beliefs. Also, he may choose his long-term goals and the boundaries within which he will pursue them. Since a person is morally responsible for what he plans even if he can only indirectly control it, it is a suitable candidate to ground desert.

A second objection is that my account cannot establish that desert is grounded by character rather than character-shaping acts. The objector argues that persons are responsible for their character only because they are responsible for their character-forming acts. This in turn rests on the notions that persons are responsible for what they focus on in practical reasoning and what they directly control and both the focus and direct control are aimed at actions. At the very least, the objector might claim, there are no thought experiments that can isolate the character-shaping acts from the character itself.

The problem with this objection is that the character-shaping acts must themselves spring from a person’s character if he is to be morally responsible for them. Hence, the same responsibility-based

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