Confusion of Tongues A Theory of Normative Language by Stephen Finlay

Author:Stephen Finlay
Language: eng
Format: epub
Published: 2014-06-09T16:00:00+00:00

This solution extends also to open-ended normative questions, like ‘What ought I to do?’ These enquiries couldn’t be completely open-ended, and the speaker presumably has in mind some general description of a relevant end; for example, What ought I to do [in order to achieve an end I would desire if I was aware of the possible outcomes]? Pragmatically this would be interpreted as having the illocutionary force of inviting direction.

The end-relational theory can therefore accommodate these obscure uses of unrelativized normative language and explain their communicative function. But our pragmatic principles require us also to show that speakers might reasonably believe these utterances to be optimal ways of promoting their conversational ends. These practices are justified and predicted because, in J. L. Mackie’s words, “there are advantages in not specifying them precisely.”7 First, the unrelativized sentences are less wordy and more efficient, and therefore comply with Grice’s submaxim of manner to be brief. (Speakers and audiences generally prefer not to waste their time uttering or listening to unnecessary verbosity; on our pragmatic principles the shorter sentence is therefore better, all else being equal.)8

One consequence is that the permissibility of ellipsis generally implies an expectation or requirement of ellipsis. If somebody says, ‘I want you to take your shoes off your feet’, her failure to omit reference to the already salient feet of the audience strongly suggests some special reason, perhaps such as that she doesn’t want the shoes taken off something else. This is significant for some metaethical puzzles: since omitting the end is generally permissible when saliently desired, making the end explicit will generally be infelicitous and impermissible in these cases, and therefore will tend to pragmatically indicate (p.150) that the end is not saliently desired. This will strengthen the pragmatic separation between unrelativized use of normative words as typically having practicality, and relativized use as lacking it.

Failing to make an end explicit when one isn’t uniquely salient can also have other advantages. Sometimes an end is difficult to describe even when the speaker has something determinate in mind, because it is complicated or defies description by its nature. This seems characteristic of aestheticends, involving kinds of emotional, intellectual, and spiritual experiences, for example, making it difficult to adequately articulate the way in which paintings, sculptures, musical compositions, or sunsets are good. Sometimes an audience may be incapable of easily comprehending the end, so the speaker’s purposes are better served by communicating merely that it’s an end that is or would be desired. Parents often seem to speak this way; for example, ‘Eating too much candy isn’t good’ (explaining dental or pancreatic health to young children isn’t easy), or ‘There are reasons for our rules.’ At other times specifying the end may be too traumatizing for the audience: ‘You ought not talk to strangers’…in order not to be abducted, molested, or murdered!

A speaker may just be confident that some relevantly desired ends are at stake, without having any particularly in mind. Perhaps she has no particular reason for selecting one out of a cluster of ends she has in mind.

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