Chained to History by Steven J. Brady;

Author:Steven J. Brady;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Lightning Source Inc. (Tier 3)

The End of American Unilateralism

It would be left to the Republican administration of Abraham Lincoln to finally seek a solution to the problem in its multilateral context. On March 22, 1862, Secretary of State William H. Seward informed Lyons of his perceptions regarding the “inefficiency” of the American and British and patrols of the African coast, and added that this was only exacerbated by the Union’s need to withdraw “a considerable part of our own naval force from that coast to suppress a domestic insurrection.” Seward sounded out Lyons on the matter: Would he be interested in negotiating on the matter of suppressing the trade? If so, Seward would submit “a Convention, upon which, if acceptable to your Government, the President would ask the advice and consent of the Senate of The United States.” It would appear that the British minister was more than eager. He responded on the very same day that his government would “be prompt to agree to any stipulations giving increased efficacy to [Anglo-American] co-operation.” He added that he had “no hesitation in declaring that I am ready to enter at once upon the negotiation which you do me the honour to propose to me.”88

Matters moved quickly. By March 28, Lyons was able to send to Russell a draft treaty written by Seward. Lyons’s only objection was to the limited duration of the agreement, which was set to expire in ten years. But this was a small point for the Briton, since “the Treaty proposed by Mr. Seward corresponds in every other particular to the views of Her Majesty’s Government.”89 Russell soon indicated that he “entirely approve[d]” of the treaty and instructed Lyons to “sign the Treaty forthwith.” By April 24, the Senate had approved the Lyons-Seward Treaty, including a limited mutual right of search, and had done so unanimously.90 The entire matter was completed in just over a month.

The Lincoln administration had ample motive for its actions in reversing the decades-old policy of opposing the right of search. The Union was, by this time, exercising the belligerent’s right to search vessels to enforce its blockade of the Confederacy. Washington thus “had good reason to soft-pedal their traditional concern about freedom of the seas.” Additionally, Lincoln and Seward sought, by showing flexibility on an issue so important to the British, to decrease the likelihood of British intervention on the side of the South. If they were also motivated by a sincere desire to end the trade—as is probable—then they could hardly have taken a more salutary step: “all other remedies had been tried in vain … and the reciprocal right of search remained as the only possible solution of the problem.”91 That solution had finally been adopted.

The consequences of Lincoln and Seward’s concession were not what Americans had feared for decades. Granting the Royal Navy the right to search American ships on the Atlantic did not, in fact, result in a new wave of impressment of American sailors. Nor was American sea power and commerce driven from the ocean by an expansionist British Empire.

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