Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August 1914–February 1915 by James Goldrick

Author:James Goldrick [Goldrick, James]
Language: eng
Format: azw3
ISBN: 9781612518817
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Published: 2015-05-14T16:00:00+00:00

12

THE SCARBOROUGH RAID

THE START OF DECEMBER WAS QUIET. FOR THE BRITISH, THERE WERE THE now regular submarine scares, but work on protecting the anchorages proceeded steadily. New appointments and the whirlwind entry of Lord Fisher galvanized activity, and Jellicoe now thought that the Grand Fleet would have enough secure harbors before the end of the year, which would ease the strain of having no certainty of safety in port.

Despite this prospect, Jellicoe still believed that the situation was very dangerous. He was convinced that Germans had to be aware of the absence of at least Invincible and Inflexible and would be planning a sortie. He pinpointed 8 December as the most likely date for a raid, when there would be no moon and favorable tides. The C-in-C proposed sending the battle cruisers south to cut off the German retreat, while the Grand Fleet operated to the north. The Admiralty, gaining increasing confidence in Room 40, assessed there were no signs of German activity and that it was unnecessary to risk the battle cruisers. Jellicoe took the hint and cancelled the operation.

The Germans were indeed planning another attack, but issues of strategy and of personality were proving difficult to resolve. Following the Yarmouth raid, there were increasing concerns that the Kleinkrieg was not enough. With von Spee at large and the oceanic war retaining promise, Hipper even took up a proposal by one of his captains for the longer-range battle cruisers to attack British shipping in the Atlantic. The problem was endurance. The battle cruisers could be modified to carry additional coal supplies, but this would not be enough. Hipper suggested that resupply could be managed by a combination of anchorages in Iceland, using colliers that had run the blockade, and a descent on an Allied port. There were huge risks, not least of which was the battle cruisers’ engineering reliability, but this was at least an attempt to break free of the impasse.1

The proposal did not sit well with either von Ingenohl or von Pohl, and Hipper’s scheme was shelved. Thinking within both the Fleet Command and Admiralstab was focused on the emerging potential of the U-boats. German attitudes to the blockade were hardening. While global trade was reviving and the European neutrals provided many alternative avenues for raw materials and goods from the United States in particular, Britain’s long-term position still appeared stronger than Germany’s. The U-boat could provide a way of striking at Britain’s supply lines while the High Sea Fleet remained in being.2

There were other forces at work. Von Tirpitz made a determined effort to push Ingenohl aside and install von Pohl as his replacement. Von Müller saw this for what it was, a ploy by von Tirpitz to take charge of naval operations, and refused to recommend any change to the kaiser. Von Müller took soundings in the fleet that confirmed that von Ingenohl was still considered the best man for the job—he had been preferred to von Pohl in 1913 at least partly because of the squadron commanders’ collective view, as well as the previous C-in-C (von Holtzendorff).

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