Battle of Matapan 1941: The Trafalgar of the Mediterranean by Mark Simmons

Author:Mark Simmons [Simmons, Mark]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: World War II, Military, General, The Battle of Matapan 1941: The Trafalgar of the Mediterranean, history
ISBN: 9780752472645
Google: Ka8TDQAAQBAJ
Publisher: The History Press
Published: 2011-10-21T00:14:28.861523+00:00

12

Daybreak, 28 March

On the afternoon of 27 March Admiral Iachino remained in something of a quandary because no further signals were intercepted from the Sunderland flying boat of 230 Squadron. Signals did come in from the British Naval Headquarters at Alexandria asking the Sunderland for further information but nothing further was heard from the crew, and he hoped that the crew had radio problems. However, at about 18:00 another signal from the Sunderland was intercepted, merely stating they had arrived at Corinth, had nothing further to report because of bad visibility, and they had maintained radio silence.

About the same time Vittorio Veneto received a signal from Supermarina reporting to the fleet commander they had intercepted the earlier message from the Sunderland. It was just as well Iachino had the foresight to have his own cipher staff on the flagship, and did not have to wait six hours for Supermarina to forward messages. It also contained the wrong information referring to the number of destroyers.

What caused Iachino even more concern was further information from the Naval High Command stating that because of weather conditions over Alexandria the afternoon air reconnaissance would not take place. Yet on board his radio intercepted a message from Aegean Air Command stating reconnaissance had been carried out over Alexandria at 14:00 and 14:45 confirming all the major units of the British Mediterranean Fleet were in harbour. It gave him no confidence in naval-air cooperation.1

By early evening Iachino was convinced that the British would withdraw all their convoys. They had intercepted several more British signals of the ‘Immediate’ category, which his cipher men had been unable to break. But it was plain to him and his staff that the British had issued a general alarm, but, perhaps, did not believe the threat required serious counter measures. The Admiral hoped Supermarina would be able to decode these signals, and would recall the fleet if they thought it in danger. However, this was extremely unlikely as Commander Bragadin explains.

Supermarina was later criticised because with the element of surprise gone it did not call off the operation. But it must be remembered that this occasion was not born of a real tactical opportunity. Rather it was the result of a plan conceived under a press of considerations that were predominately political.2

The Fleet Commander only had a nominal command of his ships which were still controlled even at sea by Supermarina until contact was made with the enemy. He also had no control over the aircraft that were supposed to be supporting the fleet. In contrast Cunningham had complete command of his fleet and many air elements from the RAF as well.

The two Italian groups sailed on the evening of 27 March, the 1st and 8th Divisions proceeding toward the Aegean while Vittorio Veneto and the 3rd Division headed toward the south coast of Crete. However, at 22:00 Supermarina ordered the 1st and 8th Divisions to reverse course and join the flagship group the following morning. They had reached the same

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