Balkan Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe by Daniel N. Nelson

Author:Daniel N. Nelson [Nelson, Daniel N.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Freedom, Political Science, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9780813379562
Google: tjJpAAAAMAAJ
Goodreads: 4208328
Publisher: Westview Press
Published: 1991-05-08T00:00:00+00:00

The Army and Bulgaria’s Transitions

How has the Bulgarian People’s Army (BPA)—the armed forces of Bulgaria—contributed to, or been affected by the social and political movements within the country? How will it (the BPA) respond, and what are likely roles for the Army in Bulgaria’s political future? From a distance, there appeared to be a close symbiotic relationship between the Bulgarian Communist Party (BPA) of Todor Zhivkov’s regime and the Army.42 Such appearances would lead us to presume that the BPA was not anxious to see this link disrupted by fundamental political change.

The Army’s tie to the BCP, however, was never primarily one of ideological affinity or, indeed, of political orientation at all. There is ample evidence to the contrary, with both empirical findings and inferential assessments pointing towards a military with dubious loyalties to communist rule.43

Bulgaria’s military officers were loyal less to Zhivkov and the BCP than to the army as an institution, and the military’s access to resources. As long as the pipeline for manpower and material resources was wide open, with the country maintaining the highest per capita level of armed forces in the Warsaw Pact outside the USSR while devoting huge proportions of its central budget to military expenditures, the BPA was a potential Zhivkov ally. But the resource base began to be endangered by the simultaneous disruption of social equilibrium, brought on by Zhivkov’s ethnic assimilation policy, and the dangerous economic trends that Zhivkov’s fumbling economic policy could not reverse. Judgments about such dangers to the military brought about ever-growing support for removing Zhivkov.

The personification of the army’s interests has been General Dobri Dzhurov who, for twenty-eight years, was Bulgaria’s defense minister. Even at seventy-five years old, Dzhurov certainly held the key to power during the critical months from late 1989 to mid-1990. After legitimating elections, some of his ability to affect immediate political processes waned—but there is little doubt that his continuity and visibility from November 1989 to August 1990 were not accidental. Whereas then-President Petar Mladenov, Party Leader Aleksadr Lilov and Premier Andrei Lukanov gained an electoral victory on which to base the Bulgarian Socialist Party’s “right to rule,” Dzhurov has been someone with authority quite apart from the political fray.

Precisely how it was that Todor Zhivkov stepped down on November 10, 1989 may never be fully unraveled. Some small demonstrations had occurred, and underlying economic and ethnic tensions were dear and present dangers to the regime. Two unintended “allies” in the removal of Zhivkov, however, could have been Gorbachev and Dzhurov. Without any communications or contact, the Soviet leadership and Bulgarian military command had come to the same condusion—Zhivkov’s time had run out, and that the Party stood a far better chance of surviving a political transformation if it stepped out “in front of the curve.” To do so required, first, sacking Zhivkov. The BCP Politburo would have never taken that step, however, without Soviet insistence and Dzhurov’s assurance that the Army would neither defend Zhivkov nor take action of its own. Only Dzhurov could have been asked for such a guarantee, and only he could have provided it.

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