An Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology by Jan Patocka;James Dodd;

Author:Jan Patocka;James Dodd;
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780812699869
Publisher: Lightning Source Inc. (Tier 3)
Published: 2017-03-30T00:00:00+00:00

1. See Jean Héring, “Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee,” in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 4 (1921), and Roman Ingarden, “Essentiale Fragen. Ein Beitrag zu den Wesensproblem,” Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 7 (1925). [Ed.]

2. Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, pp. 2–4, 27–28.

3. See Husserl, Ideas I, §§37, 80.

4. Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, pp. 55–56.

5. Ibid., pp. 59–60.

6. “Author’s Preface to the English Edition of Ideas,” [in Husserl: Shorter Works, p. 48—Ed.]: “The world as an intentional formation of transcendental subjectivity” here apparently means the product of transcendental subjectivity. Thus it is relative, dependent on the primary, nonrelative being of consciousness (because its being is ever presumptive).

7. See Husserl, Ideas I, §§56, 59. [Ed.]

8. Compare Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Book Three: Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences, §§7–8, pp. 22–46, to Experience and Judgment, §§84–89. [Ed.]

9. See Husserl, Ideas I, §§27–30, pp. 51–57. [Ed.]

10. See ibid., §§31–32, pp. 57–62. [Ed.]

11. Ibid., p. 58: “One procedure, possible at any time, is the attempt to doubt universally which Descartes carried out for an entirely different purpose with a view toward bringing out a sphere of absolutely indubitable being.” [Ed.]

12. Ibid., pp. 79–80: “Here the perceiving includes its Object in itself in such a manner that it only can be separated abstractively, only as an essentially non-self-sufficient [unselbstständige] moment, from its Object.” [Ed.]

13. Husserl, Ideen I, Hua III, p. 97, lines 33–39 (translation Kohák following Patočka’s Czech translation).

14. Ibid., p. 102, lines 31–36 (translation Kohák following Patočka’s Czech translation).

15. Husserl, Ideas I, p. 97: “It is indeed evident also that the adumbrative sensation-contents themselves, which really inherently belong to the mental process of perceiving a physical thing, function, more particularly, as adumbrations of something but are not themselves given in turn by adumbrations.” [Ed.]

16. Husserl, Ideen I, Hua III, p. 108, lines 28–36 (translation Kohák following Patočka’s Czech translation).

17. Ibid., p. 109, lines 1–6 (translation Kohák following Patočka’s Czech translation).

18. Cf. part 1 of J. G. Fichte’s Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre); Patočka himself, however, has elsewhere voiced reservations about this comparison, pointing out that Husserl’s idealism arises not so much out of the idea of the ego as a pure conditioning principle (i.e., one that is itself unconditioned) grasped in an “intellectual intuition,” as out of the Cartesian notion of self-consciousness as an object given in pure, indubitable evidence. See Patočka, “Der Subjektivismus der Husserlschen und die Möglichkeit einer asubjektiven Phänomenolgie.” [Ed.]

19. Husserl, Idem I, Beilage VI, pp. 389–90 (translation Kohák following Patočka’s Czech translation).

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