Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Topics 2 by Laura M. Castelli;

Author:Laura M. Castelli; [Castelli, Laura M.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781350151307
Publisher: Bloomsbury UK
Published: 2020-06-24T00:00:00+00:00

112b1 And since of things some are from necessity, whereas others are for the most part and others as it happens.

This topos takes its starting point from the difference between things. And in this respect it goes beyond the first topos which was presented and which requires10 ‘checking whether what belongs [to the subject] in another way has been given as an accident’.310 For in the present case this has been somewhat replaced, i.e. what belongs as a genus or as a proprium or as a definition [has been replaced] with ‘what belongs from necessity’ (for each of them is taken in this way), whereas the accident [has been replaced] with what [belongs] ‘for the most part’ or ‘as it happens’: for such is what can belong or not belong, in terms of which the accident was defined.311 Furthermore, if some accidents, too, are inseparable, these, too, would be the same as things that belong from necessity; for this reason he does not posit an opposition between what is from necessity and the accident. For he does not use the accident or any of the other [kinds of predicates], but rather resorts to what belongs necessarily and what does not belong necessarily as to another division.312

For we are presented with the fact that,313 of things that are, some are of20 necessity, e.g. that the human being is an animal (what belongs to all and always, this is from necessity: similarly, it is also necessary that god is imperishable), some are contingently.314 And of these contingent things, some are for the most part, e.g. that human beings have five fingers and that they turn white when they get old; some are less frequent, as the opposites of these, e.g that human beings have four or six fingers (for these things are in this way as well), or that human beings do not turn white when they get old; whereas some others are equally distributed, e.g. that human beings are citizens or not, that they are abroad or not, that they bathe or not. Given, then, that this kind of difference is present among things that are, if someone says that what belongs to something in a178,1 certain way belongs to it in another way , swapping their modes of belonging, he gives a starting point for a refutative attack. For if someone says that it is contingent that god is imperishable or that the human being is an animal or rational, this person would say that what cannot not be is contingent: for it is impossible that the god is not imperishable or that the human being is not an animal. But the one who says that it is contingent that it is an animal, this person would be saying that it is also possible that it is not an animal, since this is what is contingent. Furthermore, he would be saying that what belongs always does not belong always, for what belongs from necessity belongs always and to all. But

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