A Superpower Transformed by Daniel J. Sargent

Author:Daniel J. Sargent
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2014-06-15T00:00:00+00:00

In energy policy, Carter inherited an unenviable situation. The vulnerabilities that the oil crisis of 1973–74 manifested had not abated; instead, the United States had become more depenendent on foreign supply in the intervening years. Americans imported half the oil they consumed in 1977, up from 22 percent at the beginning of the 1970s. Domestic consumption was a major part of the problem. In 1977, Americans burned 18 million barrels of oil per day, almost half the oil burned by all the OECD countries combined and a third of total world oil consumption. They thus shared with OPEC special responsibility for driving the price of oil upward—from $10, in real terms, per barrel of Saudi light crude in 1970 to $45 in 1977. Like Gerald Ford, Carter recognized that reducing domestic demand for oil was an international imperative; unless American consumption slackened, world prices would remain high. “The success of your energy policy in reducing U.S. dependence,” Brzezinski affirmed to Carter, “will have a significant effect on our relationship with Europe and on Europe’s internal well-being.”39

Because of the decline in domestic oil production, there were no easy answers to the dilemma of energy interdependence. Some industrialized countries, such as Japan and France, had embraced nuclear energy. But Carter, who had trained as a nuclear engineer, worried about accidents and the misuse of civilian technologies for military purposes, which ensured that he would not embrace the atom as a panacea. Indeed, Carter’s eagerness to restrict the international sale of uranium and reprocessing equipment became a source of rancor within the G-7, especially with Japan. For Prime Minister Fukuda, ensuring the continuity of uranium supplies was a “life or death” issue. The controversy faded only when Carter approved the reprocessing of US-sourced uranium at Japan’s Tokai plant. A setback for nonproliferation, the spat showcased Carter’s determination to limit the spread of civilian technologies that could facilitate nuclear weapons programs, as had happened in India, which tested a fission bomb in 1974. The Tokai episode showed that world order objectives might conflict with each other—and with geopolitical goals. Restricting the spread of nuclear technologies cut against the administration’s commitment to reducing the industrialized world’s dependence on OPEC oil, raising questions about where Carter’s priorities lay.40

Carter’s attempts to manage international energy interdependence also bred friction at home. Jim Schlesinger, Ford’s secretary of defense, whom Carter appointed as a special adviser on energy, was tasked with devising an energy program capable of mitigating international vulnerabilities. In April 1977, Carter unveiled the National Energy Plan. Borrowing a phrase from William James, the president called energy conservation the “moral equivalent of war.” Failure to act, Carter warned, “could endanger our freedom as a sovereign nation.” Two days later, Carter elaborated the plan before Congress. Besides promoting conservation, he would expand domestic oil production and, where possible, substitute alternative energy sources for oil. The key to the whole concept was pricing. Energy markets in the United States remained tightly regulated, and price controls kept the prices of domestic oil and natural gas below world levels.

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