A Perfect Moral Storm by Gardiner Stephen M

A Perfect Moral Storm by Gardiner Stephen M

Author:Gardiner, Stephen M.
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 2011-03-14T16:00:00+00:00


VIII. THE “ANYTHING GOES” ARGUMENT

Before closing, I want briefly to mention one last argument for CBA that seems implicit in the attitudes of many of its proponents, and which contributes to some of the confusion around discounting. This argument suggests that in principle the approach must be able to cope with any problems that seem to beset it, because in the end any difficulty or objection can be accounted for and absorbed in a suitably sophisticated cost-benefit analysis. In other words, “anything goes”, and the devil is in the details.

This argument is importantly different from the ideological claim that cost-benefit analysis reflects the correct moral theory (e.g., utilitarianism) and that any problems can be dealt with by that theory. Instead, the argument is ostensibly nonideological. It asserts that whatever the correct ethical theory, ultimately it must be possible to model that theory in cost-benefit terms. Echoing some of the claims of the last chapter, the thought is that CBA can absorb and neutralize any substantive external criticism, because the materials of such criticism can always be accommodated within the approach. If moral information is left out of a given CBA, then we can put things right simply by adjusting the costs, the benefits, or the ways in which they are integrated. 128

This idea is worth discussing at some length. But here I have space for just three preliminary remarks. First, the idea may be a heroic one. It is not obvious that it is philosophically defensible. In the context of actual economic CBA, the basic claims seem to be (a) that any moral theory might be modeled in mathematical terms, and (b) that any such modeling could appropriately be labeled “cost-benefit analysis.”

These claims are striking: (a) comes close to asserting that ‘cost- benefit analysis’ is just another name for ethical analysis, appropriately formalized, while (b) suggests that this is because the key terms -‘cost’, ‘benefit, and ‘analysis’ – are infinitely malleable. Moreover, it is far from clear that this bold thesis is correct. In general, (a) raises deep questions about the limits of mathematical modeling, and (b) about the flexibility of the phrase “cost-benefit analysis”. Both also bring back worries about vacuousness, opacity and evasiveness in the face of the perfect storm (see chapter 7).

One sign of the challenges for (a) and (b) is that the claims face early pressure from some mainstream approaches to moral philosophy. Suppose, for example, that virtue ethics, particularism, or situationism were true. 129 Are we really so confident that these theories could be mathematically modeled? Is it plausible to claim that the behavior of the virtuous person can be adequately captured in cost- benefit terms? And what of the particularist’s reasons, whose existence, strength, and valence depend on the wider context in which they arise? Since most advocates of these views would probably regard such claims as deeply implausible, there is a strong burden of proof against the anything goes argument.

Second, even if granted, the theoretical prospect of mathematical modeling would not guarantee practical relevance.



Download



Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.