A Narrative of Denial: Australia and the Violation of East Timor by Peter Job

Author:Peter Job [Job, Peter]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: history, World, political science, Public Policy, Military Policy
ISBN: 9780522877601
Google: ivUhzgEACAAJ
Publisher: Melbourne University Publishing
Published: 2021-11-15T00:18:43.557523+00:00

The Fraser Government’s response

While the Dunn Report presented the Fraser Government with a challenge, it also offered opportunities. Given the increasing evidence of severe human rights abuses, sustained Fretilin resistance and the potential for the kind of prolonged conflict Malcolm Fraser and others had feared, it could have facilitated the sort of reassessment of policy direction originally proposed by Alan Renouf in the event of such a development. Any investigation of Dunn’s claims would have been assisted by the stated willingness of his informants to talk to Australian officials.

Such a reassessment could have taken a number of directions. Most profound would have been an abandonment of a defence of the Suharto regime on the issue, an end to military aid, and a proactive approach to raising the issues of Timorese self-determination and human rights in the international arena. The CAVR investigations demonstrate that following the initial stalemate, ABRI found itself overstretched due to national elections in May 1977, forcing it to withdraw forces from East Timor. It concludes that early 1977 was a time of relative success for Fretilin and failure for the Indonesian offensive.17 In these circumstances, the Fraser Government had the option open to it of using evidence of the humanitarian crisis and extent of the conflict in East Timor as an opportunity to support the involvement of the international community in efforts to achieve an alternative outcome. Such an approach would have impacted the relationship with Indonesia, probably impeded cooperation on issues such the Vietnamese refugee crisis, and lacked the support of the United States. On the other hand, the proximity of the two countries and the dependence of the Suharto regime on orderly relations with Western nations would have limited damage to Australian interests in the longer term. With many Western nations taking their cue from Australia regarding East Timor, Australian support for such a proposal would have had the potential to change international attitudes towards the situation and force change.

Even without taking up the self-determination issue, there were other options available to the government. It could have pressed the issue of human rights in the public arena both domestically and internationally, making it clear to the Suharto regime that continued good relations, including military aid, depended upon an end to the violations that were clearly taking place. Finally, the Fraser Government could have raised the situation with the Indonesian Government privately, preserving many elements of the ‘business as usual’ approach while making it clear that continued support for the Suharto regime was dependent upon an improvement of the human rights situation. With the New Order reliant upon international goodwill and domestic and international aid, such an approach, if nothing else, would have been likely to have mitigated the severe abuses that were occurring in East Timor.

Instead, the Fraser Government chose to maintain its unreserved and uncritical support for the Suharto regime, including proactively defending it in the international arena and denying evidence of abuses. Such an approach, by its nature, required continuing to conceal the

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