The Luftwaffe And Its War Of Attrition by Lieutenant Colonel Patricia L. C. Priest

Author:Lieutenant Colonel Patricia L. C. Priest [Priest, Lieutenant Colonel Patricia L. C.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781782898818
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Lucknow Books
Published: 2014-08-15T00:00:00+00:00

Luftwaffe Bomber Losses and Production, All Fronts – 1943

Figure 2{83}

The result: commitments all over Europe and Germany's three fronts increased as resources declined. Materiel resources were to catch up to commitments in the latter part of the war, but the loss of pilots was a resource not easily replaced.

Pilot Losses

On the eve of the war, "[i]n terms of training and morale,... the German crewmen were the equal of any, and superior to most, of their opponents."{84}Clearly training had been effective up to that time and during the initial months of Hitler's move across Europe. However, the attrition of aircraft also led to severe pilot losses, which had a damaging effect on attrition warfare (see figure 3). During the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe lost five air crew members to every one lost by the British. As a result, Goering permitted only one officer at a time in each aircraft.{85} As an example, during the first nine months of 1942, one Luftwaffe unit"... lost aircraft and crews [emphasis added] equal to its own strength once in each successive three month period. With the demands of the Russian front these losses were not all made good, and after starting with eighty-two crews the unit had only twenty-three left by September."{86} "The average number of fighter pilots available in combat squadrons over 1943 was 2105. The number of fighter pilots killed, wounded, or missing over the course of the year was 2967 or 141 percent. The inescapable conclusions that such statistics point to is that the Luftwaffe was in desperate trouble by the end of the year. ..."{87} Severe loss of aircraft was a problem in and of itself; however, the Luftwaffe's offensive war fought over enemy territory, particularly over Russia, meant irreplaceable losses in trained aircrews.{88} Pilot attrition was not only the result of losses in combat, however; it was also the result of a lack of training.

The problems with training started early on. As each crisis developed in the German pre-war years of 1936 to 1939, training suffered. Training planes, as well as instructor pilots, were taken for operational needs. This ultimately led to a ten percent shortage of qualified personnel in tactical units at the beginning of the war. Also, trainees were undisciplined, which led to an inordinately high accident rate (see figure 3).{89} Training deficiencies while conducting a strategic offensive could be attributed to the attitude of Colonel-General Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff. Believing the war would be short, he decreed that"… all resources, human and materiel, be devoted to insuring a quick decision."{90} This shortsightedness prevailed during the battle for Holland and the Battle of Britain, where training schools were cannibalized to support operational units.{91} Even with a plea from subordinates to increase training, Jeschonnek's response was, "Let's beat the Russians first, then we can start training."{92}

The Germans, however, were not to beat the Russians so easily, and abuse of the training mission continued. Because of the success of the first airlift operation in Russia

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