The Idea of Central Europe by Otilia Dhand;

Author:Otilia Dhand;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Central Europe, geopolitics, regionalism
ISBN: 9781786723987
Publisher: Bloomsbury UK

SMART PROPAGANDA THAT FAILED

To start with, the German government had a different idea of Central Europe from that represented in the dominant public discourse stipulated, and – to state the obvious – it lost the war. Imperial Germany failed to change the international structure as desired, but there is little to conclude from this outcome in regards to the notion of Central Europe, because its public discourse did not drive Berlin's policy in the first place.

In Austria, the influence of the notion varied. The Stürgkh cabinet opposed the notion vigorously, resorting to censorship to curb the public debate. The one point at which the notion truly drove the policy was in the period of Clam-Martinic's government, which, fell apart before it could bring the negotiations with Germany to completion. Central Europe enthusiasts in the Seidler cabinet might have rejoiced temporarily at the signing of the accords in May 1918, yet, after Czernin's resignation, the government changed its course profoundly and negotiated a much looser customs arrangement. Sovereignty and protection of a hard-won internal bargain ultimately took precedence over pan-German brotherhood.

However, from the ouside the situation looked different. British diplomats interpreted the May 1918 accords struck between the two emperors as the long-promised arrival of Central Europe, and policy changed accordingly. Support lent to the propaganda activities of small nations gained momentum, though the British government could not bring itself to support a dismemberment of Austria-Hungary until it fell apart on its own. The recognition of CNC certainly boosted confidence in the rebels lined up against Vienna but, of itself, did not bring about the break-up of empire.

The story of Masaryk in all of this is curious. He operated with a complex definition of Central Europe – invoking German domination of the region, the suppression of self-determination rights and the possibilities for a Berlin–Baghdad axis – tailored to its chosen audience, to induce a threat perception in ruling circles of the Entente countries. Central Europe was presented as an emerging regional identity harmful to the interests of individual allied countries, one that could only be countered by the break-up of Austria-Hungary. This negative othering failed, too. While Masaryk's portrayal of Central Europe was broadly in line with perceptions of his intended audiences, the remedy he suggested to this threat was not. He won recognition of CNC due to his POW army, not his portrayal of Central Europe.

The two governments he was most keen to get on his side – the United States and the British – devised their own versions of Central Europe by the war end. In Britain, Amery's extraordinary proposal that Britain should accept a German-friendly Central Europe defined as a federation of successor states, was turned down. The United States initiative, which heralded a creation of a Mid-European Union as a federation pompously announced at the Independence Hall, fell apart within less than two months. This failure to construct a new regional identity was due to the lack of commitment on the part of the nations involved.

Thus the concept of Central Europe failed completely.

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