Perceptions of China and White House Decision-Making, 1941-1963 by Adam S.R. Bartley

Author:Adam S.R. Bartley [Bartley, Adam S.R.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science, Government, Public Policy, International, International Relations, History
ISBN: 9781000766486
Publisher: Taylor and Francis
Published: 2019-11-26T05:00:00+00:00

Notes

1 Robert L. Beisner, Dean Acheson: Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 7.

2 Nancy B. Tucker, Patterns in the A Life in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 163.

3 Harassment is meant here as blockading the mainland, stopping shipping from trading with Beijing, and the general provoking of conflict. Ibid., p. 17.

4 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 344.

5 According to Joseph Jones of the Public Affairs bureau at the State Department during the Acheson years, “When he [Marshall] gave Dean Acheson, under his command, full authority over policy, administration, and operations, the Department of State for the first time in years became an integrated institution subject to the authority of the President, capable of conducting foreign relations in an orderly manner. Acheson, rather than competing with members of his staff, knew how to draw from them wise counsel, harmony, and constructive effort.” Joseph Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: Viking, 1955), p. 100; John C. Donovan, The Cold Warriors: A Policy-Making Elite (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), p. 83.

6 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 355.

7 For more on this see Irving L. Janus, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), pp. 51–54.

8 For South Korea and Syngman Rhee’s militarism and desire to forcefully take back the North see, “Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of the Army (Royall)” Feb. 8, 1949, FRUS 1949, The Far East and Austral-asia, Volume VII, ed., John G. Reid (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 956.

9 Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (New York: Berkley Books, 1974), p. 295.

10 This is underscored by Alexander George, who states that with the intoxication of success with MacArthur’s Incheon invasion, domestic considerations, and wishful thinking, decision-makers came to swift conclusions about new aims for expanding the war, whereupon intelligence appraising Beijing’s intentions “did not challenge sharply or early enough the widespread euphoria in which Administrations leaders shared.” Cited in Janus, Victims of Groupthink, p. 50.

11 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 378.

12 These included Senators Tom Connally (Texas), Edwin C. Johnson (Colorado), Wayne Morse (Oregon, Indiana) and Warren Magnuson (Washington). Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 166.

13 Quoted from June M. Grasso, Truman’s Two China Policy 1948–1950 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1987), p. 18.

14 See for instance, Warren I. Cohen, Dean Rusk (Totowa, NJ: Cooper Square Publishers, 1980), p. 39.

15 Samuel W. Rushay Jr., “Harry Truman’s History Lessons,” Prologue Magazine 41, No. 1 (Spring 2009), www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2009/spring/truman-history.html

16 See Joyce Mao, Asia First: China and the Making of Modern American Conservatism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

17 The first of these letters signed by 35 senators was sent to Truman in May. James Fetzer, “Congress and China, 1941–1950” (Ph.D. Diss., Michigan State University, 1969), p. 210.

18 Quoted in Quincy Wright, “Non-recognition of China and International Tensions,” Current History (Mar.

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