Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order by Shahram Chubin Charles Tripp

Author:Shahram Chubin, Charles Tripp [Shahram Chubin, Charles Tripp]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, Strategy, Political Science, General, International Relations, Diplomacy
ISBN: 9781136043925
Google: NxKgBAAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2014-09-25T16:07:51+00:00

Barriers to Rapprochement – A Conclusion

A number of basic ‘structural factors’ have tended to complicate Iran’s relations with the Arab Gulf states and specifically with Saudi Arabia. Geopolitical elements, such as disparities in power, in population size, strategic depth, coastline and other asymmetries, in part capture the idea; so, too, does reference to the Gulf – whose very nomenclature is disputed – as illustrative of an Arab–Persian divide, cultural and historical as well as geopolitical. There is also a sectarian component in that Iran is the only Shi’i state and most of the world’s Shi’a live in an arc around the shores of the Persian Gulf. This has increased the Arab rulers’ sense of vulnerability and has made harmonious relations with Tehran difficult.

These basic factors have been exacerbated by the conduct of the Islamic republic. In seeking a leadership role, initially by exporting the revolution, and later by diplomatic means and through appeals to Islamic solidarity, Tehran has ensured that relations remain infused with suspicion. The Arab states fear that significant parts of their populations may be manipulated by an unfriendly power. The very susceptibility of these sectors to such appeals, reflecting their poor integration and lack of representative institutions, increases the fury and suspicion of the Arab authorities, yet allows political agitation to be attributed to foreign designs rather than to indigenous discontent.

Regionally, the Saudi government has invoked foreign threats to ensure its leadership of, and promote cohesion within, the GCC.92 Saudi Arabia can play upon the GCC states’ anxieties and attribute all the area’s problems to Iran (and Iraq). This is easy enough, as noted in the domestic disturbances in Bahrain. In cases where Iran has a bilateral dispute with a neighbour, as with the UAE, Saudi Arabia can make the issue a test-case of Iran’s intentions, freezing relations until it is suitably resolved. Although not all of the Gulf rulers are willing to subscribe to the Saudi view to the same degree and may seek to establish their independence by cultivating closer relations with Iran, there are limits in this regard.

This state of affairs favours Saudi Arabia’s extension of its authority in the peninsula and handicaps Iran, which is obliged to prove its good intentions repeatedly. Riyadh has sought to depict Iran as an irresponsible menace; in this it has had much help from Tehran. The concessions Iran would have to make and the measures it would have to take in order to overcome Arab suspicions would be virtually inconceivable given Iran’s domestic situation. The social composition of the area, the waning authority of some of the ruling families and Iran’s manifest power all have the capacity to produce an atmosphere of suspicion. In December 1995, Iran’s frustration with this state of affairs was given authoritative voice:

Saudi Arabia has always had a desire for domination in the region and the [West] has encouraged it to have this state of domination over the other five countries … Who pursues this [island] issue? Saudi Arabia? Why? It wants to cover up its own hegemony.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.