Human by Karolina Hubner;

Author:Karolina Hubner;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: OUP Premium
Published: 2022-06-15T00:00:00+00:00

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1This follows from axiom 1 and proposition 14 of part 1 of the Ethics, henceforth E1a1 and E1p14. Further abbreviations I use are: “app” for appendix, “c” for corollary, “d” for definition, “praef” for preface, and “s” for scholium. Passages from the Spinoza’s works are quoted from The Collected Works of Spinoza, two vols., ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985; reprint, 2016), referred to henceforth as C I and C II.

2So E2p10 says: “the being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, or substance does not constitute the form of man” (C I, 454).

3I have argued for this in Ursula Renz, The Explainability of Experience. Realism and Subjectivity in Spinoza’s Theory of the Human Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), but see also Valtteri Viljanen, Spinoza’s Geometry of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), who, however, denies that individual essences are the result of efficient causation. Dominik Perler, “Spinozas Theorie der Universalien,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 70/2 (2016): 163–88, 185, who, too, identifies individual essences with structural features, remains indifferent with respect to their causation.

4See Dominik Perler, “Spinoza über Tiere,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96/2 (2014): 232–61, and Margaret Dauler Wilson, Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 178–95.

5See the passage following E2p13s, C I, 458–62.

6There is no controversy about this, even though some scholars defend the view that the notion of form still plays an important role in Spinoza; see Pierre-François Moreau, “The Metaphysics of Substance and the Metaphysics of Form,” in Spinoza and the Human Mind: Papers Presented at the Second Jerusalem Conference, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel, 27–36 (Leiden: Brill 1994), 27–36, and François Zourabichvili, Spinoza und physique de la pensée (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 2002), 13–49.

7This has been argued for recently by Michael Thompson; see part 1 of his Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 25–82. Historically, the second part of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment played a crucial role.

8See, famously, Elisabeth Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), and for elaboration, part 2 of Thompson, Life and Action, 183–46. The locus classicus is Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. Peter Caramello (Rome: Marietti, 1952), II, qq. 8–15.

9Not sursprisingly, it is on the basis of this scholium that Yitzhak Melamed has charged Spinoza with maintaining “speciesism,” i.e. a species-related sort of chauvinism; see his “Spinoza’s Anti-humanism: An Outline,” in The Rationalists: Between Tradition and Innovation, ed. Carlos Fraenkel, Dario Perinetti, and Justin Smith, 147–66 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 163–64. For critical discussion, see Perler, “Spinoza über Tiere,” 248–59.

10For the charge that Spinoza’s metaethics are amoralistic see Melamed, “Spinoza’s Anti-humanism,” 158–61.

11As these terms are all connected in Spinoza, I will use them more or less interchangeably henceforth.

12This is the title to the second part of the Short Treatise as it appears in the register of the chapters which precedes the first part (C I, 60). The title which is given at the beginning of the second book says only “On Man and What Pertains to Him” (C I, 93).

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