How We Hope by Martin Adrienne;

Author:Martin, Adrienne;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2013-04-07T04:00:00+00:00

The First Extreme: Aquinas and Irascible Hope

Even given the above qualifications as regards sustenance, it is tempting to think hope can sustain us through trials only if it is a special kind of supercharged motive force, capable of barreling through all barriers. Indeed, it is this thought that leads many of the opponents of the orthodox definition to their opposition. For, on this definition, the only motivational force at work in hope is desire, which seems too prosaic to power us through profound obstacles. And one might be suspicious of the incorporation analysis for the same reason: the motivational powers at work in hope are the same ones at work in all exercises of rational agency; hope is not a unique power.

Quite independently of his arguments that hope is a theological virtue, Aquinas argues that hope must be an “irascible appetite,” because otherwise it would be unable to power us through obstacles to the achievement of our desires.10 More broadly, he argues that we must have two distinct motivational powers—the “concupiscible” and the “irascible”—if we are to explain our ability to overcome obstacles; and hope, as one of our responses to obstacles, is an exercise of this power. I will argue that our ability to overcome obstacles presupposes only one motivational power, guided by belief in the existence of said obstacles. We do need two distinct motivational powers to explain the agent’s experience of her own attractions and to give a full account of hope, as discussed in the previous chapter. For the sake of evaluating Aquinas’s position, however, it will be enough to focus on the presuppositions of our ability to overcome obstacles. So, for present purposes, I will be defending the explanatory power of a Humean or Lockean, monist theory of motivation.11

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.