Dying to Learn by Michael A. Hunzeker

Author:Michael A. Hunzeker
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Cornell University Press

The Evolution of French Politics, Strategy, and Operations

A range of daunting political challenges beset the prewar French Army. A deep civil-military divide was chief among them. An ideological chasm separated the Left from the Right as politicians on both sides used the army as a weapon in their struggle for power.7 The debate often centered on manpower policy and conscription. Liberal politicians wanted a nation in arms made up of short-serving conscripts to act as a bulwark against militarism. They also wanted conscripts to serve for two years, which they saw as sufficient to teach recruits how to fight but not so long to enable the army inculcate them with militaristic values. Conservatives thought mass national armies were outdated and favored a small army composed of long-serving professionals. Although conservatives knew the army could not completely abandon conscription, they thought conscripts should at least serve for longer periods of time. The two sides fought hard over what might otherwise seem like a relatively minor difference in manpower models, because each side worried that the other might use the army against it. The Left worried that conservatives might use the army to suppress liberty. Meanwhile, conservatives feared that the Left wanted to transform the army into an “instrument of revolution.”8 Conservatives held the upper hand from 1870 to 1905, a period in which conscripts served in the army for three to five years. From 1905 to 1913, left-wing politicians reduced this obligation to two years, although it was increased back to three years immediately before the war.9

This power struggle had a toxic effect on the army. Two especially deleterious effects stand out. First, patronage, ideology, and religion played an outsize role in selecting and promoting senior officers.10 Politicized promotion schemes systematically eroded the army’s ability to learn and analyze by both empowering underqualified leaders and creating incentives to toe the line. Second, since conservative and liberal politicians alike feared what might happen if the other side gained control over the army, both sides tried to splinter their ability to plan and coordinate.

French politicians did at least share a common threat perception. Both sides of the divide saw Germany as the primary rival and most likely wartime adversary. Conservatives and liberals also agreed on the need for allies. France therefore began forging an alliance with Russia in 1891 and squeezed a military commitment out of Britain in 1906.11 The French government hoped the prospect of a two-front war might deter German aggression or, if deterrence failed, force Germany to divide its army. Of course, this strategy meant both France and Russia had to attack at the first sign of hostility. Otherwise, Germany might find a way to fight and defeat the two in sequence.

This overarching grand strategy is one reason the army prioritized offensive operations before the war.12 Between 1871 and 1914, the French Army developed a series of sequentially numbered operational plans in the event of another war with Germany.13 Based on the traumatic experiences of the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War, early

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