Democracies Against Hitler by Alexander J. Groth

Author:Alexander J. Groth [Groth, Alexander J.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Europe, Germany, Military, World War II
ISBN: 9780429838279
Google: 9qubDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2018-08-10T05:06:57+00:00

By 1940 and 1941, the kind of assistance the United States was providing to Britain was not nearly enough to stave off a British defeat, and a Nazi victory. Nothing short of American military intervention would have been enough. American aid extended to the Allied powers opposing Nazi Germany, including aid to Great Britain, generous as it may have been, was almost certainly in all respects too little and too late. But with some unintended assistance from Hitler it proved very important.

The United States’ aid to Britain, especially following the collapse of France in June 1940, had double significance. It was important in the material sense, particularly with respect to American supplies, food, and fuel shipped across the Atlantic. Above all, however, it was important psychologically to the maintenance of British resistance to Nazism. It is clear that for both Winston Churchill and most British anti-Nazis of the bleak period of 1940–1941, American intervention represented the last, great hope of ultimate victory over Hitler. Alternatively, if it had somehow become clear in the aftermath of the Battle of France that the United States would not become involved in the war, the likelihood of a British collapse, probably through a negotiated peace, would have been overwhelming.

Together with Winston Churchill, it was to Roosevelt that the credit must go for doing what was necessary to forestall British failure during the critical period between the fall of France and the launching of Barbarossa. Even though British efforts in the war were only marginally hurtful to the Nazis during those critical months when Britain virtually alone opposed Hitler, ultimate victory and defeat were dependent precisely upon some slender margins.

As long as Britain stayed in the fight, Nazi Germany needed to maintain significant forces to prevent possible British incursions on the Continent. The unavailability of those forces in June of 1941 might have made a difference in the Nazi conquest of Russia. As long as Britain continued to fight Hitler, the several European governments-in-exile had a base of operations for themselves and both resistance and hope in the conquered countries could be plausibly maintained. The British dominions around the world were very unlikely to continue to fight if the “mother country” were to quit the war. A British collapse would have turned North Africa, the Mediterranean, and oil-rich Middle East to Nazi control and exploitation. There would have been no readily available bases for any conceivable American invasion of Europe in subsequent years, even if all sorts of changes had occurred in the United States’ attitude concerning the desirability or necessity of American intervention against Nazi Germany.

The calendar year from June 1940 to June 1941 was the year of greatest vulnerability for the Allied cause. It was the period during which Hitler was most likely to win the war and the Allies most likely to lose it. It was a period during which it would have made the most sense – if such a term can ever be applied to this transaction – for Britain to seek a negotiated peace settlement with Nazi Germany.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.