Defeating Hitler by Paul Winter

Author:Paul Winter [Winter, Paul]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, World War II, Europe, General, Modern, 20th Century
ISBN: 9781441114310
Google: lsBNDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
Published: 2012-06-07T01:11:58+00:00

APPENDIX VII.

THE ORGANISATION OF GERMAN MILITARY SUPPLY.

I.- MAIN REASONS FOR SHORTAGES IN THE FIELD.

That the Armaments Industry of Germany produced huge quantities of war materials is undoubted. It is equally true, however, that the Army in the field was almost invariably short of equipment of all kinds, especially after 1942, and particularly in M.T., ammunition and tanks. The wastage rates in the German Army far exceeded anything calculated by the Allies throughout the war. British and American wastage rates had hitherto to be employed as a criterion. The Tables 1 to 20 attached to this Annex show that wastage rates were often many times in excess of production. The wastage figures given in these tables include, however, all forms of wastage known, including battle casualties, normal wear and tear, issue to other services or allied States, &c., but do not take account of returns from repair. They are given in total figures in the tables, but there are sufficient examples available to show that this figure was made up of a rough monthly average of 90 per cent. battle and wear wastage, and 10 per cent. “other causes” chief of which was distribution and allocation to organisations outside the Army. It is certain enough, therefore, that wastage of equipment in the German Army was extraordinarily high. It is also reported that German training methods were very wasteful of equipment. It is known, indeed, that the realistic methods employed in German Army training must have used up much equipment, but there are no reliable statistics on the subject.

2. The reasons for the high wastage figures in action must be many, but it is obvious, and it can be checked from a scrutiny of the tables, that Germany suffered numerous defeats in which losses of equipment were extremely high, such as Stalingrad, the Falaise pocket, Tunisia, and the various retreats in Russia. Ground attacks by Allied aircraft are known to have caused relatively high tactical losses of equipment. Strategic bombing scarcely enters into consideration here, although the attacks upon the Ordnance Depots caused a certain loss of stocks which at the moment it is impossible to assess. Interrogations of the higher personalities involved, however, confirm the impression that such losses played a very small part indeed in the overall position.

3. Chief among the causes, according to Speer, Minister of Armament and War Production, Halder, former Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Jodl, Head of the Operational Planning Staff of the OKW, and others, was the policy of distribution. Speer declares that this inept policy was decided by OKW, Halder says that OKW was giving effect to Hitler’s demands, with which statement Jodl agrees. There is, indeed, no doubt that, especially towards the end of the war, Hitler himself decided allocations, frequently with fantastic results. The basic policy of allocation was that 90 per cent. of new production was to be given to units being formed, for new setting-up, while 10 per cent. went to the field to replace the losses of formations in action.

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