Defeat at Kasserine: American Armor Doctrine, Training, and Battle Command in Northwest Africa, World War II by Major Mark T. Calhoun

Author:Major Mark T. Calhoun [Calhoun, Major Mark T.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, United States, Europe, General, Germany, Special Forces
ISBN: 9781786250308
Google: wDNvCwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2015-11-06T05:06:46+00:00

CHAPTER 4 — TRAINING

“I guess nations going to war must go through a stumbling period before they purge the incompetents.”{89} — BG Theodore “Ted” Roosevelt Jr.

Predeployment Training

When General Headquarters (GHQ) was activated in July 1940, the Regular Army consisted of 243,095 enlisted soldiers on short-term enlistments, led by a corps of 14,000 professional officers. These soldiers were scattered among many posts, and dispersed throughout the total activated force of eight infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and two armored divisions, all well below full strength. Another 226,837 soldiers made up the various units of the National Guard. The Organized Reserve consisted of unit blueprints, only to be manned upon mobilization, augmented by 104,228 trained reserve officers who had attended ROTC or Citizens’ Military Training Camps.{90} GHQ initiated a massive mobilization effort in September 1940, when induction of National Guard units began. The army brought 278,526 enlisted men into active service by November 1940, more than doubling the size of the active force in only three months. The Selective Service Bill passed into law on the same date that National Guard mobilization began, would bring another 606,915 selectees into active duty by July 1941. The total strength of the field forces had reached 1,326,577 officers and enlisted men by 1 July 1941, a fivefold increase in less than a year.{91}

This dramatic expansion of the active field forces created significant training challenges. One of the foremost was the manning of units who’s Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&Es) were frequently changing. Observations of German Army tactics and organization caused the various arms to update their T/O&Es to meet the new threat, and these changes created a ripple effect throughout the network of interlocking unit organizations. One of the most significant of these changes was the creation of the Armored Force on 10 July 1940. Initially consisting of two brigades, this force underwent a rapid expansion to four armored divisions by March 1941. As the number and size of armored organizations increased, the existing pool of experienced personnel was spread out among these units to form a training base on which to build the new organizations. This process was unavoidable, but caused significant turbulence within the armor community’s experience base.{92}

GHQ faced significant challenges accomplishing their mission of training this rapidly expanding force for combat. Prior to the activation of GHQ, training had been the responsibility of the field armies, and no standardized Army-wide training plan existed. The GHQ chief of staff, Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair, and his staff of only twenty-four officers had very little time to develop and implement one. GHQ issued a national training directive in September 1940 that focused on standardization of basic and small unit training, and did not address specialized skills training. Maneuvers of mobilized guard units conducted in 1940 found significant deficiencies including poor physical fitness, substandard individual soldier training, outdated or non-existent equipment, old and unserviceable field gear, and an aged and untrained officer corps.{93}

In addition to writing field manuals and advising the War Department on

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